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Abstract
Despite a vast theoretical literature on contagious behavior of investors, little is known about its empirical
evidence in a real financial crisis setting. This paper examines evidence for contagious runs in money market
funds during the 2008 financial crisis, drawing on a rich data set tracking U.S. money market funds’ daily flows
and their enrollment statuses in the Treasury Department’s Temporary Guarantee Program (TGP).
Evaluating the positive externality effect from a peer fund’s enrollment in the TGP on non-enrolled funds, we
show that panic-driven runs were contagious across funds. We find that funds’ stability due to their enrollment
in the guarantee program spilled over and enhanced daily flows to a non-enrolled fund by $1.8 million
compared to already-enrolled funds. Moreover, we find that retail investors were less likely than institutional
investors to return to prime money market funds even after enrollment in the guarantee program, implying
that the latter benefited more from the government back-stop. Results are germane to policies seeking to
rebuild investor confidence in times of financial crises and reduce the chance of future contagion in this
industry.
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1 Question and motivation
During an epidemic outbreak, a contagious disease can be transmitted widely and may even lead to a severe
pandemic if not properly contained. Similarly, ﬁnancial shock can be contagious and can lead to a sudden
collapse of a ﬁnancial system. In a tightly intertwined ﬁnancial system, there may be a high probability of
such a systemic risk because a modest but contagious shock can be easily transmitted and ampliﬁed across
players in the system, rapidly causing detrimental outcomes. Understanding the mechanism through which
ﬁnancial risk is transmitted in the ﬁnancial system and identifying its empirical evidence are important steps
in creating a robust ﬁnancial market.
This paper provides the evidence for contagious runs in ﬁnancial institutions, focusing on the U.S.
money market funds during the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. The collapse of one of the biggest U.S. money market
funds, the Reserve Primary Fund, on September 16, 2008 prompted a massive withdrawal from the U.S.
prime money market fund industry. Within only three days, approximately $300 billion was withdrawn from
money market funds investing mainly in non-government securities. We show that the massive withdrawals
were contagious across the money market funds.
As Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have noted in the banking sector, investors can generate a self-
fulﬁlling crisis because each investor wants to take his investment out earlier than his peers, when asset
liquidation is costly. This mutually-reinforcing incentive of investors to take the same actions is often termed
a strategic complementarity problem, and it can make otherwise healthy ﬁnancial institutions insolvent. In
addition, when ﬁnancial institutions hold similar assets in their portfolios or in collateral pools while making
collateralized loans,1 a massive withdrawal from one ﬁnancial institution can propagate the risk of panic-
driven runs to other ﬁnancial institutions. This happens because investors in other ﬁnancial institutions
fear that a massive redemption request may trigger a ﬁre sale of commonly held asset classes in the original
ﬁnancial institution, which in turn will generate subsequent distress for the market price of assets in another
fund's portfolio. In this sense, a mutually reinforced process across groups of investors can lead to a systemic
collapse of the ﬁnancial market. Therefore, substantiating the existence of contagion in a real ﬁnancial crisis
setting sheds light on future policy about ﬁnancial markets and institutions.
To date, however, there is little empirical evidence for the contagion risk of runs across ﬁnancial
institutions, despite the potential for such developments and their possible role in causing a systemic ﬁnancial
crisis. In a theoretical framework, Goldstein (2005) studied the strategic complementarities between two
groups of investors - currency speculators and bank investors - as a mechanism to explain the observed
1Collateralized lending is a form of debt contract that requires a borrower to pledge asset or cash equivalents in return for
cash, which the lender can liquidate should a borrower default. If the borrower pays back the debt, the asset is returned to the
borrower.
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correlated frequency of banking and currency crises in emerging economies. In this paper, we develop and
test several empirical hypotheses regarding the potential for contagious runs across money market funds,
based on a stylized model of investor redemption behavior in a global game framework.2
Empirical identiﬁcation of contagion risks is challenging because ﬁnancial institution failures often
occur in a short time-frame and with many unobservable factors (Allen, Babus and Carletti (2010)). For
several reasons, money market funds in the U.S. provide an ideal setting to test the contagion risk of
panic-driven runs in ﬁnancial institutions. First, money market funds are not regulated as banks, but they
issue securities that are very similar to demand-deposit contracts which are prone to panic-driven runs.
Second, in 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department provided a Temporary Guarantee Program (TGP) similar to
traditional bank deposit insurance. This conﬁdence-building policy could serve to cut the chain of contagion
across funds, which we can utilize to identify the contagion risk of runs. Third, a fund-sponsoring company
usually has several money market funds, so we can observe investor behavior at both a fund and complex
level.
To identify contagion risk of runs across funds, we use the U.S. Treasury's Temporary Guarantee
Program (TGP)an externally imposed stability measureas a source of variation in contagion risk among
money market funds. Speciﬁcally, we look at U.S. money market funds' daily ﬂows during the ﬁrst term of
the TGP. This time period is signiﬁcant because Lehman Brothers collapsed on September 15, creating a
huge negative shock to the capital market and investors began to withdraw en masse from money market
funds. On September 19, 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department oﬀered the TGP, an unprecedented guarantee
program to the entire money market mutual fund industry for the ﬁrst time in its history. The guarantee
program aimed to ﬁx a coordination failure among investors and to avert investors' panic, which might have
generated huge withdrawal requests from money market funds. Individual investors were not eligible to
enroll in the TGP and funds that wished to be covered by this program were required to announce their
enrollment and pay a premium of 1 to 2.5 basis points of assets under management as of September 19,
20083 to the Treasury Department. To the extent that a contagion problem was a real possibility during the
period following Lehman's collapse, the announcements that some funds had enrolled in the TGP likely had
a positive spillover eﬀect on other non-enrolled funds. This phenomenon is the ﬂip side of contagious runs
across funds. This is our main identiﬁcation strategy for identifying the contagion risk of runs across funds.
Because the announcement was made in a fund level, our identiﬁcation strategy will enable us to identify
2The global game framework (Carlsson and Damme (1993)) has been widely implemented in various areas of economics,
including currency crises ((e.g., Morris and Shin (1998)) and bank runs (e.g., Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)).
3This premium was only for the ﬁrst-term of the guarantee program, which lasted three months until December 18, 2008.
This program was subsequently extended twice, until April 30, 2009 and then again until September 18, 2009. Funds were
required to pay additional premiums if they wished to be covered during the extended periods.
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contagion risk of runs across funds.
Although enrollment status in the TGP is an attractive empirical identiﬁcation tool, several challeng-
ing issues need to be addressed. The ﬁrst is the adverse-selection issue related to signaling mechanism of
enrollment announcement. Money market fund sponsors (for example, JP Morgan, Blackrock, Fidelity, and
Vanguard) might have announced their enrollment in the guarantee program earlier or later based on their
risk level. To validate our identiﬁcation strategy to use a fund's enrollment status as an exogenous shock
to its own and other funds' investors behavior, we run a simple test whether the enrollment timing was
associated with funds' various characteristics including risk level and sponsor information. After analyzing
the enrollment timing of funds in the TGP, we ﬁnd that none of the funds' risk level (e.g., yield, portfolio
composition) and sponsor information (e.g., bank-aﬃliated or not) were related to enrollment timing. The
only factor in determining the enrollment status was investors-base information (i.e., retail or institutional
investors funds). Beneﬁting from the richness of data on daily fund ﬂows and enrollment status, we use the
panel structure of data to control for ﬁxed and persistent unobservable characteristics (i.e., investors-base
information) of funds that might have aﬀected enrollment status. Therefore, the adverse-selection or sig-
naling mechanism might not have had much impact on our empirical ﬁndings as long as the unobservable
factors are not changing in a daily frequency.
Second, there could have been many unobserved time-speciﬁc factors during the crisis, such as changes
in short-term capital market conditions, shocks from other ﬁnancial sectors, or even rumors. We overcome
this issue using a time ﬁxed eﬀects model. Although a disadvantage of time ﬁxed eﬀects is that we cannot
identify the eﬀect of a time-trend on fund ﬂows, the coeﬃcients of interest about stability spillover eﬀects are
still identiﬁable using cross-sectional variation in funds' enrollment statuses. Data compiled from the Security
and Exchange Commission's (SEC) disclosure system shows that fund sponsors did not all announce their
TGP enrollments on the same date, which provides the opportunity to test for the existence of contagion
risk of runs across money market funds.
The analysis shows that investors generated self-fulﬁlling runs across funds in the 2008 crisis. Our
investigation of daily fund ﬂows after the TGP was implemented reveals that funds experienced positive
externalities from peer funds in other fund complexes having enrolled in the guarantee program. When
funds enrolled in the guarantee program, which served to contain the contagion risk from those funds, other
funds experienced decreased outﬂows even though they were not yet enrolled in the guarantee program.4 The
positive externality was more pronounced in non-enrolled funds than in those already-enrolled as expected.
For example, each additional enrolled peer fund induced 4.1 basis points more daily inﬂows to non-enrolled
4The structure of the guarantee program eliminated the possibility of returning investors expecting more coverage. We
discuss and negate alternative explanations for this fund ﬂow pattern in section 6.3.
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funds, compared to already-enrolled funds. A simple calculation implies that a fund with median asset size
($4.7 billion) on September 29, 2008, could have an extra $1.8 million a day, due to the peer funds' stability.
To identify potential channel of contagion, we conduct the above analysis by assigning diﬀerent weight-
ings to peer funds' enrollment announcement. The idea is that investors might have expected greater positive
externality from peer funds' stability, especially when those funds had greater contagion risk to their own
funds and their TGP enrollment removed the contagion risk from them. We ﬁnd that the enrollment of
funds with more non-agency repurchase agreement (repo) transactions generated greater stability to other
funds implying that investors worried about the risk of contagion through repo transaction channel (Gorton
and Metrick (2012)).5
We also examine whether retail and institutional investors behaved diﬀerently once the TGP was in
eﬀect. We show that, in prime money market funds, institutional investors reinvested more actively compared
to retail investors, after the introduction of the guarantee program. During the ﬁrst term of the guarantee
program (September 19December 18, 2008), the total average daily fund ﬂows to prime money market funds
were 33 basis points higher, compared with during the Lehman crisis (September 1519, 2008). By contrast,
during that same guarantee period, retail investors withdrew by 34 basis points per day on average compared
to the Lehman crisis period. This stark behavioral diﬀerence between retail and institutional investors is
also observed in the second and third terms of the guarantee program (December 19, 2008September
18, 2009). We also examine fund ﬂows to government money market funds, which mainly held Treasury
bills and government agency securities. We ﬁnd little and statistically insigniﬁcant diﬀerence between retail
and institutional investors' behaviors. Accordingly, the impact of the guarantee program was concentrated
among institutional investors in prime money market funds. Retail investors did not return to prime money
market funds, even after the guarantee program insured them against loss.
This study makes several contributions. First, it contributes to the literature on panicked investor
runs and coordination problems in a ﬁnancial crisis. Empirical evidence of coordination problems in a
real ﬁnancial crisis setting is relatively rare, compared to numerous theoretical papers in this literature.
Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2010) empirically substantiated the implication of strategic complementarity
risk among investors by showing that illiquid equity funds experienced more outﬂows than liquid funds after
bad performance. Our study demonstrates the existence and magnitude of strategic complementarity risk
across groups of investors (that is, money market funds), focusing more on the systemic aspect of panic-
driven runs. Although Goldstein (2005) studied this risk in a theoretical framework, it has not been tested
in a real ﬁnancial crisis setting despite its high potential for systemic crisis in the ﬁnancial market.
5We also develop a model of contagion with this channel in the appendix.
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Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the eﬀects of government stability-building measures
such as deposit insurance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that provides evidence on
the existence and magnitude of the positive externality eﬀects of such measures. In this paper, we examine
the externality eﬀects of peer ﬁnancial institutions' enrollment in the TGP, which shares many features with
traditional deposit insurance. Even though deposit insurance for banks has existed for eighty years in the
United States, its actual impact has not been fully understood in an empirical setting. Most studies to date
have focused on the problem of moral hazard (for example, Keeley (1990)), but the impact of government
policy on averting investor panic has not been extensively studied in the literature. We ﬁll this gap by
demonstrating an additional aspect of stability-building measures  the positive externality eﬀect across
depository institutions.
Third, this paper contributes to the policy debate on systemic ﬁnancial market regulations by docu-
menting the existence and magnitude of systemic risk in a ﬁnancial crisis. Concerns about systemic risk in
the ﬁnancial market were the rationale for the concept of market-wide regulation including the Dodd-Frank
Act in the U.S. and macroprudential regulation in the E.U. (Borio (2003); Shin (2010)). Understanding the
impact of U.S. government policy on money market funds in 2008 enables us to better assess the systemic
risk of the investor coordination problem and to devise better government policy in future ﬁnancial crises.
2 Related literature
The main economic hypothesis at the core of this paper is that investors can generate mutually reinforcing
activities in the face of a ﬁnancial shock, especially when coordination among investors is not possible. This
is often discussed as one of the main causes for worsening the ﬁnancial crisis, and the literature on this topic
is extensive.6
This paper is directly related to the literature on the recent ﬁnancial crisis and the shadow banking
system, of which the money market fund industry is one very important component. Although the money
market fund industry is the 5th largest ﬁnancial sector in the U.S.,7 studies on these modern ﬁnancial
institutions are relatively scarce compared with the vast literature on traditional commercial banking. Among
the few that studied the shadow banking sector, Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov (2013) examined the size
of collateralized lending contracts in money market funds and security lenders, and found that the Asset-
Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) had ﬁrst-order impacts on the capital market during the 20072008 crisis.
6For a thorough review on the recent ﬁnancial crisis, see Allen, Babus and Carletti (2009) and Brunnermeier (2009).
7As of 2008, U.S. commercial banks had $10.247 trillion, open-end mutual funds had $5.435 trillion, private pension funds
had $4.552 trillion, life insurers had $4.515 trillion, and money market funds had $ 3.757 trillion as their assets (FRB (2010)).
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Gorton and Metrick (2012) highlighted the important role that repurchase agreement (repo) contracts played
in exacerbating the ﬁnancial crisis. Shleifer and Vishny (2010) showed that the shadow banking system is
prone to swings in investor sentiment. Covitz, Liang and Suarez (2009) and Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010),
among others, provided empirical analyses of the ABCP market in the United States. These papers focused
more on individual ﬁnancial institutions rather than the systemic aspect of risk translation in the money
market funds arena, which is the focus of our study.
Another body of literature related to this paper is the research on ﬁnancial risk contagion. Our study
provides empirical evidence of contagious fund runs in a real ﬁnancial crisis. Focusing on the interbank
lending market, Allen and Gale (2001) characterized structures that are prone to liquidity risk contagion.
The liquidity risk was transmitted via direct lending-borrowing linkages. Iyer and Peydro (2011) found
evidence for contagion risk via interbank linkages in India. Diamond and Rajan (2005) studied contagious
bank failures via a liquidity shortage channel. Goldstein (2005) examined risk contagion between bank
investors and currency speculators via the strategic complementarity problem. Benmelech and Dlugosz
(2009) provided empirical evidence for the existence of a collateral channel for contagious bankruptcy in
airline companies. Iyer and Puri (2012) found that a depositor was more likely to run on a bank when such
behavior was observed in her social network such as neighborhood.8
This paper is also related to a growing literature on money market funds. The additional contribution
of this study is that we hand-collect the sequence of funds' enrollment in the TGP and use it as a tool
to identify the contagious behavior of investors in a real ﬁnancial crisis setting. Some recent papers (e.g.,
Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013), Strahan and Tanyeri (2013) and Wermers (2010)) showed the importance
of the Guarantee Program but from diﬀerent angles. Wermers (2010) showed that institutional funds were
run more than retail funds and that the withdrawers were likely to reinvest in government money market
funds in the same fund complex during the early phase of the 2008 crisis. McCabe (2010) explored the
cross-sectional relationships between fund outﬂows and three categories of risk (portfolio risk, investors
risk, and sponsor risk). He found that funds with high yields, institutional investor-oriented, and risky
sponsors, experienced more outﬂows during the September 7October 8, 2008 period. Burcu Duygan-Bump
(2013) focused on the eﬀect of the Federal Reserve Boards' AMLF program (Asset-backed Commercial
Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility) on short-term lending markets. Chernenko and
Sunderam (2012) showed that the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010 was transmitted to U.S. ﬁrms via
money market funds. Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013) investigated the risk-taking behavior of money market
funds over the 20072010 period, and found that money market funds of sponsoring companies with high
8Other empirical studies on systemic ﬁnancial risk include Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011); Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010);
Jorion and Zhang (2009); and Iyer and Peydro (2011) among others.
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reputational concerns and limited resources took less risk after the asset-backed commercial paper crisis in
2007. Strahan and Tanyeri (2013) showed that money market funds did not take excessive risk after the
TGP was implemented, contrary to the moral hazard eﬀects. Our paper uses the TGP as an empirical
identiﬁcation tool to ﬁnd the evidence for contagious runs across funds.
The literature on deposit insurance is also related to the present study. Our paper extends this liter-
ature by providing an additional aspect of deposit insurance  a positive externality eﬀect across depository
institutions. Earlier studies focused on banks' moral hazard problem. Keeley (1990) argued that deposit
insurance enabled banks to take excessive risk, which exacerbated the moral hazard problem in the early
1980s when competition intensiﬁed in this industry. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) examined 61
countries in 19801997 and found a positive association between the existence of deposit insurance and a
banking crisis. However, Iyer and Puri (2012) found deposit insurance eﬀective in mitigating bank runs in
the 2001 bank failure in India. Our study is providing an additional evidence for stabilizing eﬀect of the
government guarantee of deposit contract.
3 Background information on money market funds and the 2008
crisis
3.1 Money market funds
A money market fund9 is a mutual fund that invests mainly in short-term credit market instruments such as
Treasury securities, certiﬁcates of deposit (CDs), repurchase agreements (repo), or asset-backed commercial
papers (ABCP). The ﬁrst U.S. money market fund was created in the 1970s when the government imposed
a cap on commercial bank deposit rates. Money market funds which had direct access to the credit market
could provide higher yields than banks, and quickly gained popularity among both retail and institutional
investors. At their peak in 2009, money market funds had $3.9 trillion in total assets under management.10
According to the Investment Company Institute,11 33 million American households owned money market
funds in 2012.
Money market funds are regulated by Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, which
seeks to ensure that these funds do not take excessive risks in their investments. Although money market
9An excellent source of information about money market instruments and money market funds is Stigum and Crescenzi
(2007) and Investment Company Institute (ICI)'s archive: http://www.ici.org/mmfs.
10Total assets of commercial banks and mutual funds were $11.2 trillion and $6.9 trillion in 2008 according to the Federal
Reserve Board's Flow of Funds.
11(ICI):http://www.ici.org/mmfs.
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funds are not insured by the U.S. government, fund sponsors often provide support to their money market
funds in times of trouble (Stigum and Crescenzi (2007)). For this reason, money market funds have been
considered as a safe and liquid way to hold cash and earn returns that exceed bank rates.
3.2 Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy in 2008 and Breaking the Buck
Unlike other mutual funds, money market funds use an amortized accounting method when calculating their
net asset value (NAV). Under this scheme, if the market value of a portfolio ﬂuctuates within 0.5 cents per
dollar, investors receive $1 NAV when they redeem their investments. If the market value of a portfolio
increases above $1, a fund distributes the proﬁts as dividends in order to make its NAV equal to $1. If the
market value of a portfolio falls below $0.995, this is called breaking the buck, and investors can redeem
only the market value of their investments which is less than $1 per share. This structure potentially allows
investors to panic in withdrawing from funds, if they believe all other investors are going to withdraw and
drive the NAV below $0.995. Over the years, the investment industry has strenuously avoided such an
outcome, and fund-sponsoring companies have provided ﬁnancial support to ensure $1 NAV (Stigum and
Crescenzi (2007)).
Two cases of breaking the buck have occurred in the history of U.S. money market funds. The ﬁrst
happened in 1994, when Community Banker's U.S. Government Money Market Fund lost a large fraction
of its investments in ﬂoating rate securities. Because that fund held long positions in interest-sensitive
investments, the market value of its portfolio declined substantially when interest rates rose quickly in
1994.12 The second breaking-the-buck event happened in 2008, when the Reserve Primary Fund, one of
the oldest money market funds in the United States, lost value due to its investment in unsecured debt
issued by Lehman Brothers. When Lehman Brothers ﬁled for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the
Reserve Primary Fund had to report that its NAV fell below $0.995. Within days, this fund faced massive
redemption requests. Although its investors eventually recovered 99 cents per dollar after a long period of
court adjustments, this event triggered market-wide redemptions from institutional funds mainly investing
in non-government securities.
Facing severe price dislocations in the capital market, the U.S. government instituted several tempo-
rary programs to relieve distress in the money market fund industry. On September 19, 2008, the Treasury
Department announced a Temporary Guarantee Program for money market funds and the FRB announced
the Asset-backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF). The AMLF
program provided collateralized loans to bank holding companies, which could buy asset-backed commercial
12ICI (http://www.ici.org/pdf/12_mmf_history.pdf).
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papers (ABCP) from money market funds and use these securities as collateral to borrow from the Federal
Reserve at no discount. Burcu Duygan-Bump (2013) showed that this program was eﬀective in stabilizing
the asset-backed commercial paper market.
3.3 The U.S. Treasury Department's Temporary Guarantee Program (TGP)
On September 19, 2008, the Treasury Department announced the Temporary Guarantee Program for Money
Market Funds. All money market funds registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and regulated under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 were eligible for this temporary
program.13 As the program was voluntary, money market funds seeking coverage had to apply and pay
a premium between 1 and 2.5 basis points of total assets, depending on their portfolio value. Individual
investors were not eligible to enroll. Enrollment decisions were made by each funds' board of directors and
the announcement was made at the fund complex level. If an enrolled fund's net asset value dropped below
$0.995 (the Guarantee Event), the fund would have to liquidate its portfolio and the Treasury Department
would indemnify the loss. The coverage of this program was predetermined by the closing balances on
September 19, 2008. Any amount in excess of this limit was not covered; however, returning investors were
covered up to their closing balance on September 19, 2008.
The initial term of the program lasted until December 18, 2008, but the Treasury Department later
extended the program twice, the second term until April 30, 2009 and the third term until September 18,
2009.14 Enrollment in the second and third terms also was voluntary, but only funds that had enrolled in
the ﬁrst term coverage were eligible. For the program's ﬁrst term, the application window was open from
September 29, 2008 to October 8, 2008. Because enrollment in the Temporary Guarantee Program marked
an important change in the fund's status, the SEC required each fund to announce its decision via a public
disclosure system (SEC's EDGAR).15 During the one-year period of the Temporary Guarantee Program,
no money market fund broke the buck, and therefore, the Treasury Department did not have to pay any
compensation.
13http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1163.aspx
14http://cranedata.com/archives/news/2008/12/#item-2004
15According to our compilation of the disclosure documents (Form 497), almost all money market funds (except a handful of
funds aﬃliated with the Reserve Fund and Lehman Brothers) enrolled in the Temporary Guarantee Program in the end.
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4 Framework and hypotheses
4.1 Contagious Runs across Funds
Money market funds are required to hold safe and liquid investments under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, as noted above. A possible side eﬀect of this rule is that many money market funds
tend to end up with similar assets in their portfolios, which can be problematic during a time of market
turmoil. One such asset class is asset-backed commercial paper, which was the reason that the Federal
Reserve Board saw the need to provide a liquidity provision in this market (the AMLF program). Since the
AMLF program targeted only one speciﬁc asset class, the possibility of contagion risk of runs remained via
other asset classes such as non-agency repurchase agreement (repo) transactions or unsecured debt of non-
government agencies. We found that mean correlation between funds' yields during the six-month period
before the September 2008 crisis was 0.98, which implies that the money market funds industry very likely
was exposed to contagion risk through common asset holdings.
A panic-driven run on a fund can spread to other funds when investors develop fears about their own
funds' investment linkages with the troubled funds. When ﬁnancial institutions hold similar assets in their
portfolios (or collateral pools when making collateralized loans), a massive withdrawal from one ﬁnancial
institution can propagate panic-driven runs to other ﬁnancial institutions. This arises because investors in
these other ﬁnancial institutions fear that a massive redemption request in the original fund will trigger a
ﬁre sale of commonly held assets of the same class, which will generate subsequent distress in the portfolio's
market price. Even when funds are not holding the exact same portfolio, a panic-driven run can spread
to other funds because a small negative shock can move the market price of a share below $1, in turn
exacerbating the coordination problem within the fund. In other words, because peer investors' actions
within the same fund or other funds can generate externality eﬀects in their own investments, investors in
the whole market are incentivized to herd in the same direction, that is, run on the funds. So strategic
complementarity (that is, the reinforced incentive for investors to choose the same action because of peers'
actions) can occur not only within one group of investors, but also across diﬀerent groups of investors. This
mechanism is developed more formally in Appendix A using the global game framework as in Goldstein
(2005) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005).
The Treasury Department's Temporary Guarantee Program provides an interesting setting in which
to test for contagion risk across funds. Insofar as the guarantee program ﬁxed a coordination failure issue,
it eliminated the possibility of panic-driven runs on money market funds that had enrolled in the program.
As there was time variation in funds' enrollment statuses over the period, we can analyze the impact of
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the Temporary Guarantee Program on peer funds' stability. We argue that, to the extent that contagion
was a real concern during the crisis, an announcement that some other funds had enrolled in the guarantee
program would have a positive spillover eﬀect on non-enrolled funds.
We use the already-enrolled funds as a comparison group to measure the magnitude of the externality
eﬀect of additional peer funds' enrollment in the guarantee program. The positive externality eﬀect would
be more pronounced on non-enrolled funds than on already-enrolled funds, because already-enrolled funds
were protected by their own insurance purchase, and peer funds' stability would not change the soundness of
already-enrolled funds. In other words, the externality eﬀect would be asymmetric based on funds' enrollment
status in the guarantee program. This argument is summarized in the following:
Hypothesis 1: Peer funds' enrollment in the guarantee program had a greater positive externality impact
on non-enrolled funds than on already-enrolled funds.
Because enrollment announcement was made at a fund complex level, this hypothesis is related to
the contagion risk of runs across funds in diﬀerent fund complexes. To highlight the intuition behind this
hypothesis, assume that funds in a Fund Complex A enrolled in the guarantee program. This does not change
the portfolio risk of funds in Fund Complex B, but it reduces Fund Complex B's exposure to contagion risk of
fund run emanating from Fund Complex A. If there was contagion risk, then the enrollment announcement
of Fund Complex A would have an externality eﬀect on other funds. This eﬀect is termed the vaccine eﬀect
in epidemiology, and it is a central problem in the eﬃcient provision of public goods (Groves and Ledyard
(1977); Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986)). Our identiﬁcation strategy is discussed and implemented in
Section 6.1.
4.2 Comparison of Investors' Behavior: Retail vs. Institutional
The mutual fund literature has documented that retail and institutional investors often behave diﬀerently.
Sirri and Tufano (1998) showed that retail investors are more inﬂuenced by salient prior performance and
the marketing eﬀorts of mutual funds. Anagol and Kim (2012) found that retail investors were unlikely to
pay proper attention to mutual funds' shrouded fees. Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2012) proposed and
experimentally veriﬁed a salience theory, in which decision makers put more weight on the most prominent
states. Recent studies of money market funds (McCabe (2010), for example) also found that institutional
investors responded more quickly to market conditions. Nevertheless, none of these studies explored how the
Temporary Guarantee Program for mutual funds aﬀected retail and institutional investors diﬀerently.
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Accordingly, we hypothesize that retail investors did not make full use of the Temporary Guarantee
Program because they were inﬂuenced to a greater extent by bad news about the elevated risk of money
market funds than by the government's stability measures. Focusing on the entire period during which the
guarantee was oﬀered (September 19, 2008  September 18, 2009), we evaluate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The Temporary Guarantee Program was used more extensively by institutional investors
than by retail investors.
Testing this hypothesis provides important implications for policy measures in the ﬁnancial market.
If there was clientele bias in the implementation of government intervention, then it would be important to
consider the distributional impacts of such an outcome. If retail investors were not savvy enough to quickly
withdraw from funds at the forefront of the crisis, and they were slow to make use of the government-provided
stability measures, there could have been cross-subsidization issues from retail to institutional investors.
5 Data description
The main sources of data are iMoneyNet, a data provider on money market funds, and the SEC's disclosure
system (EDGAR). Fund characteristics and daily asset under management information were provided by
iMoneyNet. The announcement date of each fund's enrollment in the Temporary Guarantee Program was
hand-collected from the SEC EDGAR system (Form 497: Deﬁnitive materials).16 Money market funds are
mainly categorized by their investor base (retail vs. institutional) and investment universe (government vs.
nongovernment prime securities). The prime money market funds invest mainly in non-government, highly
rated private securities, while government money market funds mainly invest in government-issued securities.
The prime money market funds have constituted the largest category in the money market fund industry
since the early 2000s, and total assets in prime money market funds reached almost $2.1 trillion in September
2008. We focus on the prime money market funds with institutional and retail investors because these funds
bore the investment risk that is essential to understanding investor behavior.
16A typical announcement had the following format taken from Bank of America's Columbia Money Market Funds: The
Board of Trustees of each of the money market funds listed above has approved and the Funds have applied for participation in
the U.S. Treasury Department's Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (the Program) through December
18, 2008. Subject to certain conditions and limitations, share amounts held by investors in each of the Funds as of the close of
business on September 19, 2008 are guaranteed against loss under the Program in the event the market-based net asset value
per share is less than $0.995 and a Fund subsequently liquidates. The Program only covers the amount a shareholder held in
a Fund as of the close of business on September 19, 2008 or the amount a shareholder holds if and when a guarantee event
occurs, whichever is less. The Program is subject to an overall limit of $50 billion for all money market funds participating in
the Program. The cost to participate in the initial three months of the Program will be borne by each Fund without regard to
any expense limitation currently in eﬀect for the Fund.
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The iMoneyNet data is two-stage stratiﬁed, in the sense that each fund complex has several funds
and each fund has several share classes. Share class level information includes the fund's investor base
(institutional or retail), expense ratio, asset size, and ticker symbol. Portfolio level information includes
the fund's name, broad category of investment (for example, fraction of investment in Treasury bills, repo,
time deposits, domestic/foreign bank obligations, ﬂoating rate notes, or asset-backed commercial paper),
asset-weighted average maturity in weekly frequency, asset size, and gross yield. Fund complex level in-
formation includes the fund complex name, administrative information (fund complex contacts, custodian
banks, domiciled state, manager information, redemption/purchase deadline), and bank aﬃliation if any.
We complement fund characteristics provided by iMoneyNet with information extracted from each
fund's most recent quarterly disclosure forms prior to September 2008 (Form N-CSR, N-CSRS, N-Q). From
the disclosure forms on portfolio holdings, we collect information about unsecured securities issued by Lehman
Brothers held in each money fund, if any. We also collect information related to repo transactions such as
principal amounts, interest rates, collateral types, and counterparties.
All variables are formally deﬁned in Table 1. By examining the portfolio level asset size of each share
class and its names, we can assign a unique portfolio identiﬁcation code to share classes that were managed
under the same funds or portfolio. We include only funds with assets of more than $1 million because small
funds can have highly volatile ﬂows in relation to their asset size. We also exclude fund complexes with only
one portfolio. Nevertheless, this criteria is more conservative than other papers using the money market
fund data of iMoneyNet and so provide a more representative sample. We exclude the Reserve Funds and
Lehman Brothers aﬃliated funds from the sample because those funds' stability was materially compromised
after Lehman's collapse and the Reserve Primary Fund's breaking the buck.17 The ﬁnal sample accounted
for 93% ($1.95 trillion) of the total prime money market fund assets on September 2008.
Table 1 here
The average asset sizes of share classes and portfolios were $3.13 billion and $13.64 billion respectively
over the period of September 15 - December 19, 2008. Immediately following Lehman Brothers' collapse on
September 15, 2008, funds on average experienced investors' redemption by 12.4% of the total assets under
management. About 27% of share classes were exposed to unsecured debt issued by Lehman Brothers,
and 17% of share classes were exposed to repurchase agreements (repo) collateralized by non-government
or non-agency securities. The average maturity of a portfolio was 45 days, and about 30% of assets were
17Including them only reinforced our result for the analysis of contagious runs within fund complexes, and we did not
include them in the sample for analyzing contagious runs across funds because those were ineligible to apply for the Temporary
Guarantee Program.
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maturing within seven days. On average, it took 12 days for fund complexes to announce their enrollment
in the Temporary Guarantee Program once the application period began. About 52% of share classes were
for institutional investors, and about half of share classes were aﬃliated with bank sponsors.
6 Empirical analysis
In this section, we estimate an empirical model to test the hypotheses developed in the previous section.
Section 6.1 investigates whether runs were contagious across funds (Hypothesis 1) by analyzing the impact
of peer funds' Temporary Guarantee Program enrollment announcements during its ﬁrst term (September
29December 18, 2008). Section 6.2 describes the fund ﬂows diﬀerence between institutional and retail share
classes to test whether retail investors reinvested less in money market funds than institutional investors
even after the government-provided stability measure became eﬀective (Hypothesis 2).
6.1 Hypothesis 1: contagion across funds
The main empirical hypothesis (formally developed in Appendix A) is that fund runs can be contagious
across funds due to a strategic complementarity problem. We use the varying degrees of contagion risk
across funds to examine for the possibility of contagious runs. The variation of enrollment status over time
comes from the funds' announcement dates of enrollment in the TGP. Funds announced their enrollment
individually but the announcement dates were usually same for all funds within a fund complex. As Figure
1 shows, some fund complexes announced their enrollment immediately after the opening day of application
(September 29, 2008), but some funds waited until or after the deadline (October 8, 2008) to announce their
enrollment.18
Figure 1here
We are interested in the impact of peer funds' enrollments in the Temporary Guarantee Program on
a given fund's ﬂow. To investigate the contagion risk of a panic-driven run, we hypothesize that the impact
of peer funds' enrollment announcements in the TGP had a greater spillover eﬀect on non-enrolled funds
18Reasons for the varying announcement dates might include diﬀerences in their decision making eﬃciency, inherent risk
levels, or liquidity level of funds. More importantly, funds' unobservable characteristics (such as fund sponsors' willingness and
ability to support their funds) might have aﬀected the timing of their announcements. An analysis of enrollment decision and
its impact on our identiﬁcation are discussed in the following paragraphs.
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compared with already-enrolled funds. We specify the following empirical equation:
Flowf,c,t+1 =α+ γ0t+
2∑
τ=0
γ1,τEnrollc,t × S(−c),t−τ + γ2Enrollc,t +
2∑
τ=0
γ3,τS(−c),t−τ (1)
+ γ4Flowf,c,t + γ5Flowc(−f),t + γ6Yc + µc,t + ut + f,c,t+1,
where the dependent variable Flowf,c,t+1 is the daily ﬂow for fund f in fund complex c at time t+ 1.
19 The
covariates include the following:20
• Enrollc,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the fund complex c had announced it would enroll in the
TGP as of t, and 0 otherwise;
• S(−c),t is a stability measure provided by peer funds at time t due to their enrollment in the TGP.
Enrollment of a fund with a higher level of contagion risk may provide more stability to its peers
if its risk is contained by the guarantee program. Thus we use the weighted sum of enrolled peer
funds as a stability measure. More speciﬁcally, the stability from peer funds due to their enrollment is
characterized as a weighted sum of the number of enrolled fund complexes at t as following
S(−c),t ≡
∑
k 6=c
1{t=tk} ×Wk, (2)
where tk is the announcement date of fund complex k, 1{t=tk} is equal to 1 is t = tk and zero
otherwise, and Wk is the risk proxy of fund complex k (for example, total asset size, number of
share classes or portfolios within fund complexes, fund ﬂow during the period September 1519, 2008,
number of portfolios that held Lehman securities or non-agency repos, yield correlations). Intuitively,
S(−c),t signiﬁes the eliminated contagion risk (i.e., additional stability) from peer funds, thanks to their
enrollment in the guarantee program;
• S(−c),t−τ is a lagged value of S(−c),t. These additional terms are included to allow for the slow spread
of news about peer funds' enrollment. We include lags of up to two days in the baseline model, but
adding more lags did not change our result qualitatively;21
• Flowf,c,t is the own fund's lagged ﬂows;22
19The setting of the baseline model is similar to Papke (1994), which analyzed the eﬀect of enterprise zones on unemployment
and inventories, allowing the possible endogeneity issue of the enterprise zone designation.
20The data is two-stage stratiﬁed: The ﬁrst strata is the fund complex level and the second is the fund level. In other words,
one fund complex has several funds and each fund has several share classes. The main variation, the enrollment status, comes
from the fund complex level. As Wooldridge (2002) highlighted, variation in the upper strata level can yield smaller standard
deviation; therefore, we merged the share class level data (asset size) into the fund level data. The analysis with share class
level data is qualitatively similar.
21An analysis result with more lagged variables are presented in the Appendix C.
22Other fund speciﬁc variables may include outﬂows right after Lehman's collapse, volatility of long-term ﬂow, mean of long-
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• Flowc(−f),t is the average ﬂows of peer funds in a fund complex c deﬁned as
∑
k 6=c TNAk,t −
∑
k 6=c TNAk,t−1 × (1 + Y ieldk,t)∑
k 6=c TNAk,t−1
× 100, (3)
where TNAk,t is the total asset size of fund complex k at time t;
• Yc includes fund complex-speciﬁc variables.23 Because these variables do not change on a daily basis,
they are eventually eliminated when we ﬁrst-diﬀerence the baseline model;
• µc,t, ut are unobserved complex-level and time-speciﬁc shocks, respectively;
• f,c,t is an idiosyncratic shock to investors.
The coeﬃcient of interest is {γ1,τ}τ=2τ=0. If the estimated γ1,τ is negative, it implies that non-enrolled funds
had greater externalities from peer funds' enrollment in the TGP compared with already enrolled funds. This
means that investors of non-enrolled funds regarded the enrollment of peer funds in the guarantee program
as a stabilizing action for their own funds, which is the parallel to the concern regarding contagious runs
from peer funds.
The baseline assumption in an OLS setting would be that a fund complex's announcement of enroll-
ment and peer funds' enrollment are exogenous to individual investors. This assumption seems innocuous
because investors were not allowed to enroll individually in the guarantee program and fund complexes did
not coordinate with each other to decide when to announce enrollment in the guarantee program. Moreover,
an analysis of the enrollment timing in Table 2 reveals that funds' characteristics and portfolio allocations
do not perfectly explain the enrollment announcement timing. This analysis shows that various fund com-
plex characteristics, including asset size and portfolio allocations, are not jointly signiﬁcant in explaining the
number of business days taken for a fund complex to announce its enrollment in the guarantee program. The
only variable that is signiﬁcantly associated with the timing of the enrollment announcement is the investor-
base variable; fund complexes catering more to retail investors24 were likely to announce their enrollments
later than those oriented to institutional investors.25 Overall, the analysis result implies that investors could
term ﬂow, and dummy variables for investor bases (1 if serving only retail investors, 2 if serving only institutional, 0 otherwise).
Variables may also include portfolio composition (such as Treasury bills, repo transactions, or asset-backed commercial paper)
as of t. Because we use a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model to eliminate unobservable shocks, all these time-invariant variables are dropped
in the ﬁnal estimation.
23For example, bank-aﬃliated fund sponsors and dummy variables for investor base.
24We deﬁned retail-oriented fund complexes as those that had more than 50% of their total assets from retail investors over
the last six months.
25This ﬁnding is consistent with the risk of investor base in explaining fund run (McCabe (2010)); market-sensitive investors
are more prone to a panic-driven run. The fact that retail-oriented funds were more likely to announce later than institutional-
oriented funds will cause an underestimation of the spillover eﬀect of peer funds' enrollment in the guarantee program. Therefore,
we get even stronger results for the spillover eﬀect when we redo the analysis using only institutional-oriented fund complexes.
See Table 5.
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not guess accurately about funds' announcement timing based on observable characteristics.
Table 2
Even though the observable fund characteristics cannot explain the pattern of announcement timing,
a challenging issue of identifying the asymmetric eﬀects of peers' enrollment announcement is the possibility
of self-selection bias; that is, fund companies were not randomly selected for enrollment in the Temporary
Guarantee Program and fund complexes announced their enrollment based on their unobservable charac-
teristics. We recognize that a fund's announcement (the status of enrollment, Enrollc,t) could have been
inﬂuenced by unobservable complex-level shocks (µc,t) and time-speciﬁc shocks (ut), which econometricians
cannot control (for example, fund sponsors' willingness or ability to support, expertise in risk management,
or uncontrollable/unobservable events during the crisis). These factors will generate inconsistent estimates
of {γ1,τ}τ=2τ=0 and allow alternative explanations of the fund ﬂow patterns between enrolled and non-enrolled
funds. For example, investors in non-enrolled funds could have reinvested in their original funds since their
funds' delayed announcement might have sent a positive signal about the funds' (unobservable) stability and
strength (µc,t). If that mechanism was the dominant force that generated the observed fund ﬂow patterns,
then we cannot conclude that the estimated coeﬃcient {γ1,τ}τ=2τ=0 captures the externality eﬀect of peer funds.
The panel structure of the daily fund ﬂow data allows us to deal with the self-selection issue. If the
complex-level shock µc,t is additively decomposable into a time-invariant complex level shock (ωc) and a time-
speciﬁc shock (δt), we can eliminate the time-invariant unobservable shocks by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the baseline
model or including fund complex ﬁxed eﬀects.26 If f,c,t is serially uncorrelated, the ﬁxed eﬀect model with
fund complexes, funds, and time dummies would be more eﬃcient than the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model, but the
high frequency of our data bodes well for the presence of serial correlation among error terms. Therefore,
we ﬁrst-diﬀerence the baseline empirical model and get the following regression speciﬁcation:
∆Flowf,c,t+1 =γ0 +
2∑
τ=0
γ1,τ∆
(
Enrollc,t × S(−c),t−τ
)
+ γ2∆ (Enrollc,t) +
2∑
τ=0
γ3,τ∆
(
S(−c),t−τ
)
(4)
+ γ4∆Flowf,c,t + ∆ζt + ∆s,f,c,t+1
While ﬁrst-diﬀerencing does not eliminate the time-speciﬁc shock (ut and δt). we can still consistently es-
timate γ1,τ by introducing time ﬁxed-eﬀects ( ∆ζt ≡ ∆δt + ∆ut) to control for time-speciﬁc unobservable
shocks because the main variable of interest has cross-sectional variation (Enrollc,t × S(−c),t−τ ). The Gen-
26According to a technical survey study of Petersen (2009), this assumption of time-invariant ﬁrm speciﬁc shock is widely
used in asset pricing and corporate ﬁnance literature.
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eralized Least Squares (GLS) method27 is used to estimate the model for eﬃciency gains in the face of a
possible time-varying variance for the error term f,c,t (Wooldridge (2002)).
28 We choose the ﬁrst term of
the Temporary Guarantee Program (September 29  December 18, 2008) as our analysis period for testing
Hypothesis 1 because the announcement of enrollment in the second and third terms of the TGP did not
imply the same impact of enrollment to peer funds as the ﬁrst term.29
The testing result for Hypothesis 1 is presented in Table 3 with several diﬀerent risk proxies (risk
weighting Wc) used in the stability measure S(−c),t: (1) equal weighting for each enrolled fund complex; (2)
fund outﬂows right after the Lehman's bankruptcy (September 1519, 2008); (3) the number of portfolios that
had nonsecured security issued by Lehman Brothers; (4) the log asset size of portfolios that had nonsecured
securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (5) the number of portfolios that had non-agency repo transactions;
(6) the log asset size of portfolios that had non-agency repo transactions; (7) the correlation between funds'
gross yield for the past twelve months.
Table 3 here
The main coeﬃcients of interest are {γ1,τ}2τ=0, which measure the asymmetric externality of peers'
stability on already-enrolled and non-enrolled funds. The negative coeﬃcient of Enrollc,t×S(−c),t−τ implies
that non-enrolled funds experienced a higher level of externality from peers' stability compared with already-
enrolled funds.
This result supports Hypothesis 1 concerning contagious runs across funds: stability due to the TGP
also spread across funds. Investors considered instability in peer funds in other fund complexes as a potential
threat to themselves, and they also considered peer funds' increased stability based on their enrollment in
the guarantee program as a stabilizing measure to themselves as well. More speciﬁcally, when the equal
weighting of risk proxy is used (in column 1), non-enrolled funds experienced 0.041% higher daily inﬂows
than already-enrolled funds, in response to peer funds' enrollment announcements two days prior. In column
2, when the outﬂow amount after Lehman's collapse is used as a risk proxy, the estimated coeﬃcients of peers'
contemporaneous, one-, and two-day lagged stability measures are all negative and statistically signiﬁcant at
27In the GLS setting for estimation, we assumed intertemporary independent error structure, but assuming AR1 process also
generated qualitatively and quantitatively similar results.
28The eﬀect of the own fund ﬂows may be biased in the order of inverse time period
(
T−1
)
because Flowf,c,t is intertemporally
correlated by construction. However, the bias may be minimal because our panel data has long time periods with large T
(Wooldridge (2002)). To check the robustness of the result, we use the lagged value of Flowf,c,t−1 as an instrumental variable
for Flowf,c,t based on the sequential exogeneity condition, and estimated the model with 2SLS with clustering in a fund complex
level. The point estimates had very similar magnitudes and the same signs. But the estimated variances were slightly elevated,
potentially because we could not control for time-varying variance of the error term.
29For example, even when Fund A did not announce its enrollment in the second term of the guarantee program during the
last few weeks of the ﬁrst term, it was still insured under the ﬁrst term. However, we got qualitatively similar results with
extended time periods of analysis.
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the 5% or 10% levels. In all speciﬁcations, the most pronounced eﬀects are two-day lagged stability measures
from peer funds enrollments in the guarantee program. This may be because news about peers' increased
stability due to their enrollments in the guarantee program spread with delay or investors did not pay much
attention to contemporaneous news about other funds in later stages of enrollment period.30
Additionally, the joint test of the impact of peer funds' enrollment status indicates that peers' stability
had signiﬁcant impacts on funds ﬂows at the 5% or 10% level. We interpret this result as an indication that
investors were less likely to withdraw from their own funds when funds in other fund complexes were less
likely to experience investor runs. This mechanism also implies the positive externality eﬀect of peers'
stability, which this section substantiates.
The magnitude of the estimated externality eﬀect of peer funds' stability is economically substantial,
ranging from 0.5 to 4.5 basis points per day, depending on the choice of risk proxy and the lags on peer
funds' announcements. For example, in column 1 where the equal weighting is used as a risk proxy, non-
enrolled funds had more ﬂows than already-enrolled funds by 4.1 basis points per day. Considering the
median asset size of funds in the sample ($4.48 billion), non-enrolled funds had $1.8 million more inﬂows
than already-enrolled funds in the face of peers' stability because of enrollment in the guarantee program.31
Figure 2 shows the asymmetric spillover eﬀects to already-enrolled and non-enrolled funds. The
pattern of average fund ﬂow diﬀerences between already-enrolled and non-enrolled funds around peer funds'
TGP enrollment announcements implies that the spillover eﬀect of peer funds' stability was greater on non-
enrolled funds than on already-enrolled funds. If the spillover eﬀect of peer funds' stability was greater for
non-enrolled funds, then the ﬂow diﬀerence between enrolled and non-enrolled funds would narrow after peer
funds' enrollment announcement in the guarantee program. This graph shows the change occured with a
two-day lag.
Figure 2 here
30The speed of investors' reaction to peer funds stability is also related to the development stage of ﬁnancial crisis. In
Appendix C, we show that investors were likely to act faster in the early phase of the crisis.
31 A-back-of-the-envelope calculation implies that this magnitude is 100 times greater than the charged insurance premium
for the three month period. The median asset size of funds on September 19, 2008 was $4.72 billion and the median asset
size of funds on September 29, 2008 was $4.65 billion. Assume a fund was charged 2.5 basis point of the remaining balance
on September 19, 2008; then the premium charged was about $1 million. If we assume the fund decided not to enroll in the
guarantee program and there were additional peer fund enrollments every day for 60 business days during the ﬁrst term, the
estimated externality implies that an additional $104 million ﬂowed into a non-enrolled fund even though it was not enrolled
in the guarantee program.
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6.2 Hypothesis 2: comparison of institutional and retail investors behaviors
In our previous analysis, we empirically substantiated the real chance of systemic risk and its magnitude;
fund runs were contagious between funds, and the magnitude of the chance of systemic risk was substantial.
This section describes our investigation of whether retail investors behaved diﬀerently from institutional
investors. More precisely, we seek to compare retail and institutional investors' behaviors before and after
the introduction of the Temporary Guarantee Program over the total period of the program (September 19,
2008  September 18, 2009).32 Behavioral diﬀerences across investor types may have important implications
for policy implementation, if clientele bias is related to the analysis of ultimate beneﬁciaries and cost-bearers
of the policy.
The graph presented in Figure 3 shows the trend of assets under management of U.S. money market
funds by categories of investment (prime vs. government) and investor base (retail vs. institutional). The
vertical line indicates the date of Lehman's collapse (September 15, 2008). The upper panel shows that
there was a ﬂight to quality episode: investors withdrew from prime money market funds immediately
after the Lehman shock and invested in government money market funds (Wermers (2010)). The lower left
panel shows the stark diﬀerence between retail and institutional investors in prime money market funds.
Even after the TGP was in eﬀect, retail investors continued to withdraw from their funds. By contrast,
institutional investors invested more. The lower right panel shows that institutional and retail investors of
government money market funds behaved in a similar way when the guarantee program was eﬀective.
To describe the behavioral diﬀerences quantitatively, we estimate the following empirical model for
the entire period of the TGP (September 15, 2008December 18, 2009):
Flows,f,c,t =β0 +
5∑
τ=2
β1,τ
(
Is,f,c × Pt(τ)
)
+ β2Is,f,c +
5∑
τ=2
β3,τPt(τ) + β4Xf,c,t + β5Yc + us,f,c,t, (5)
where the dependent variable Flows,f,c,t is daily fund ﬂows of share class s in fund f of fund complex c at time
t (deﬁned as
TNAf,c,t−TNAf,c,t−1×(1+Y ieldf,c,t)
TNAf,c,t−1
); Is,c,f is an indicator for the investor base (0: institutional,
1: retail); Pt(τ) is an indicator for time frame that is 1 if t belongs to phase τ and zero otherwise; the phase τ
is deﬁned to be 1: for September 1519, 2008; 2: for September 2029, 2008; 3: for September 30December
18, 2008; 4: for December 19, 2008April 30, 2009; and 5: for May 1December 18, 2009. In other words,
Phase 1 represents the period of the Lehman crisis without any policy implementation; Phase 2 represents
the introduction period of the TGP; Phase 3 represents the TGP's ﬁrst term; Phase 4 represents the TGP's
32Recent studies on money market funds (including Wermers (2010), McCabe (2010), Burcu Duygan-Bump (2013)) showed
the behavioral diﬀerence between institutional and retail investors immediately following Lehman's collapse. We extended the
analysis to the whole time frame of the Temporary Guarantee Program.
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second term; and Phase 5 represents the TGP's third term. Xf,c,t includes fund portfolio information (or
ﬁxed eﬀects) and Yc includes fund complex level variables (or ﬁxed eﬀects). The model is estimated with
OLS regression.
We compare investor behavior in diﬀerent time frames in Table 4. Columns 13 present behavioral
diﬀerences between retail and institutional investors in prime money market funds, and columns 46 present
the same analysis for government money market funds. Behavioral diﬀerences were substantial by investor
and investment category after the Temporary Guarantee Program was eﬀective. In prime money market
funds, institutional investors reinvested actively after the introduction of the guarantee program. Column
1 indicates that total average daily fund ﬂows to prime money market funds were 33 basis points higher,
compared to the period of the Lehman crisis (Phase 1). By contrast, retail investors withdrew on average
by 34 basis points in the same period compared to the Lehman crisis. In Phase 5 (the third term of the
guarantee program), the diﬀerence was even starker. The total mean daily fund ﬂow was 35 basis points,
but retail investors withdrew by 39 basis points from prime money market funds. This ﬁnding indicates
that most of the positive inﬂows to prime money market funds came from institutional investors during the
guaranee program's third term.
Table 4 here
As a placebo test of investor behavioral diﬀerences in prime money market funds, we also examined
fund ﬂows to government money market funds, which were not negatively impacted by Lehman's bankruptcy.
Columns 46 show there was little diﬀerence in behavior between institutional and retail investors in gov-
ernment money market funds. All interaction terms of investor indicator and periods were statistically
insigniﬁcant.
In summary, our results indicate that the impact of the TGP was concentrated on institutional
investors in prime money market funds. Retail investors did not return to prime money market funds even
after the guarantee program insured them against loss.
6.3 Alternative explanations
6.3.1 Expected enrollment
One might argue that there was positive inﬂow into money market funds even before the funds actually
enrolled in the guarantee program, because investors expected more beneﬁts by investing early. An important
feature of the guarantee program was that the coverage level was already determined as of the closing balance
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on September 19, 2008; any returning investors were guaranteed up to this level as long as the fund enrolled
in the guarantee program. Additional investments beyond this guarantee limit were not insured even when
a fund later enrolled in the guarantee program. Therefore, early comers took the risk of run and breaking-
the-buck without additional coverage beneﬁts. If there were no externality eﬀect, investors would have been
better oﬀ waiting for their own fund's announcement of enrollment in the guarantee program. Because the
empirical analysis shows that investors reinvested earlier than their funds' actual enrollment dates, we can
conﬁrm that investors experienced stability eﬀect from their peer funds due to the peer's enrollment in the
guarantee program.
Even when an investor had fewer assets than the coverage limit by the time he decided whether to
reinvest now or later, it was again better to wait until the fund actually enrolled in the program if there was
no additional stability from enrolled peer funds. Early comers to non-enrolled funds had a small additional
beneﬁt of earning extra returns but the cost of facing the risk of breaking-the-buck before the fund's
expected date of enrollment was huge. Because the fund was not yet covered, investors would have incurred
a huge cost in a potential crisis.33 And it was highly improbable that investors took this risk in exchange
for small additional returns. Therefore, if there was no additional stability due to peer funds' enrollment,
investors might have waited until their funds' actual enrollment in the guarantee program.
6.3.2 Adverse-selection and the signaling eﬀect of announcement
An argument could be made that that non-enrollment in the guarantee program in the midst of others'
enrollments would be a positive signal to an investor about his own funds' soundness. For example, if Fund
A did not enroll in the guarantee program, then Fund B's announcement of enrollment might send a positive
signal about Fund A's portfolio risk to investors, which could in turn increase inﬂows to Fund A. This concern
is closely related to the endogeneity issues of enrollment decision and consequently to self-selection bias.
Nonetheless, our identiﬁcation strategy is robust to the adverse-selection bias, as discussed in the
empirical analysis (Section 6.1). The panel structure and relative high frequency of our data set allow
us to eliminate unobservable fund complex level characteristics that might have aﬀected both fund ﬂows
and enrollment status in the TGP. In addition, we showed that the funds' risk level proxied by portfolio
information was not correlated with the enrollment timing and the time-invariant investor-base information
(i.e., retail or institutional investors) was the only signiﬁcant factor aﬀecting the enrollment status over time
(see Table 2). Therefore, the signaling mechanism is not likely to bias our empirical results.
33Investors of Reserve Primary Fund had to wait for three years to recover 99 cents for every dollar investment until the court
adjustment was completed.
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6.3.3 Confounding eﬀect of the Asset-backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility (AMLF)
On the same day that the Treasury Department announced the Temporary Guarantee Program, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston (FRBB) announced a liquidity facility program called the Asset-backed Commercial
Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF). Since this program enabled banks to borrow
cash using the purchased ABCP as collateral, money market funds could sell their ABCP to banks with no
discount.
The design of this program and the ﬂow of loaned amounts over the analysis period shows that the
AMLF program could not have had much impact on our identiﬁcation strategy. According to FRB data,
the amount of loaned cash under the AMLF program peaked right after the introduction of the program,
but it promptly declined after money market funds began to announce their enrollment in the Temporary
Guarantee Program (refer to Figure 4). This implies that the eﬀect of the Temporary Guarantee Program
quickly overwhelmed the eﬀect of AMLF, and consequently, our results are not driven by the AMLF program.
In some sense, the AMLF program was substituted by the TGP in terms of staunching fund outﬂows.
Moreover, the market-wide impact of the AMLF could have been controlled in our empirical analysis
setting. Beneﬁting from the richness of data on daily fund ﬂows and enrollment status, we use the cross-
sectional variation of enrollments across funds as our main source of identiﬁcation. Considering the fact that
the AMLF program was barely used by funds after the TGP was implemented, any residual impact it might
have had on the overall capital market could have been controlled by the time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Figure 4 here
7 Implications for potential policy reform
Our study sheds light on current debates about U.S. money market fund reforms and the shadow banking
system34 in general. In 2010, the SEC implemented reforms that may reduce the risk of future runs.35 But
based on the premise that money market funds are still prone to market-wide panic, some U.S. regulators
have sought to impose more stringent regulation on the money market fund industry. Debate has continued
34The term shadow banking system refers to ﬁnancial entities that engage in ﬁnancial transactions but are less heavily
regulated than banks; it also is sometimes called the securitized banking system Gorton and Metrick (2012) Examples of
institutions in this arena include money market funds, private equity and hedge funds, monoline insurers, and other securities
operators.
35Since 2010, money market funds are required to disclose their portfolio holdings every month and shorten the weighted
average maturity. They are also required to hold 10% of its assets in cash or securities which can be liquidated in one day.
Source: ICI (http://www.ici.org/pdf/12_mmf_2010_reforms_jul.pdf)
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since 2008, and came to a head in the second quarter of 2012 when U.S. Security and Exchange Commission
(SEC) Chairperson Mary Schapiro stated, This industry and regulators are living on borrowed time . . .
Funds remain vulnerable to the reality that a single money market fund breaking of the buck could trigger
a broad and destabilizing run.36 Federal Reserve Board (FRB) Chairperson Ben Bernanke (2012) noted
that the ﬁnancial crisis occurred and was ampliﬁed by a number of vulnerabilities outside the traditional
banking sector (that is, the shadow banking system), including money market funds. Even though the SEC
instituted money market fund reforms in 2010, the agency is considering whether to require money market
funds to eliminate the ﬁxed $1 net asset value (NAV) scheme and have an extra capital buﬀer based on the
assumption that these rules will dispose of future market-wide panics. Yet the money market fund industry
is challenging regulators' concerns about the funds' stability and their exposure to system-wide risk. The
industry contends that these new rules will change the fundamental structure of money market funds and
that they will not be accepted by the majority of investors, including corporate treasurers and institutional
investors. This, it has been argued,37 would damage a key channel for short-term liquidity for corporations.
After a long debate with the money market fund industry, SEC Chairperson Mary Schapiro abandoned her
plan to propose additional regulation in August, 2012 calling instead for more research in the money market
funds industry. In this section, we evaluate several policy options to mitigate the contagion risk of runs in
money market funds industry.
7.1 Monitoring the interlinkages of portfolio and collateral
If one asset class is considered safe and liquid, it will be widely used in the capital market as collateral or
for direct investment. This study's results show that the chances of a run on depository institutions can be
transferred and ampliﬁed through the interlinkages of collaterals or portfolios. One unrealistic solution would
be to require every ﬁnancial institution to have diﬀerent asset classes in their portfolios and collateral holdings
to mitigate the problem of risk contagion and systemic risk. In contrast, a more realistic solution would
be to implement a thorough monitoring system on the quality and interlinkages of ﬁnancial institutions'
asset holdings. Regulators could monitor the quality and interconnectedness of collateral before asset classes
believed to be safe and liquid turn out to be low quality or illiquid assets.
36The Wall Street Journal (April 26, 2012): Money Funds' Battle Royal.
37ICI (http://www.ici.org/pressroom/news/12_news_tsi_study)
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7.2 Fixed or ﬂoating net asset value schemes
When a fund's net asset value is ﬁxed at $1 per share, even a small divergence of the share's market value
from $1 can generate a strategic complementarity problem among investors. If the underlying asset value
falls below $1 and early withdrawers redeem at $1 per share, money market funds must sell more shares than
the initial amount of shares early withdrawers had. All investors will ﬁnd it optimal to run on the funds,
even though the fundamental portfolios might be suﬃciently sound in the long run.
If the net asset value ﬂuctuates according to the fund's portfolio market value, and early withdrawers
can only redeem the market value of shares, money market funds would sell the exact number of shares that
the early withdrawer owned. This way, the early withdrawers would not impose a negative externality on
other peer investors. Thus, the ﬂoating net net asset value scheme would be less prone to a self-fulﬁlling run.
Although the ﬂoating net asset value scheme can mitigate the panic problem, it may nevertheless
impose large accounting costs on fund investors (as argued by the money market fund industry and cus-
tomers38). An important question beyond the scope of this paper is whether the costs of a ﬂoating NAV
(accounting cost) exceeds their beneﬁts (avoiding a self-fulﬁlling run).
7.3 Conﬁdence building measures
When the risk of a fund run is due to panic-driven reasons, conﬁdence-building measures are likely to be
eﬀective at low cost (Dybvig and Spatt (1983)). The Treasury Department's Temporary Guarantee Program
did not pay any indemniﬁcation and collected premiums of $1.2 billion39 from fund companies because no
claim was made. If investor panic is horizontally contagious across ﬁnancial institutions, insurance can
provide an even higher level of stability with similar costs, compared to the case of no contagion risk.
When moral hazard is well controlled, implementing an insurance scheme in the money market fund
industry can be a solution to preventing future disastrous runs. As this study's results show, a panic-driven
run due to strategic complementarity risk can be contagious across ﬁnancial institutions and may become a
catastrophe in a ﬁnancial system. Accordingly, a ﬁnancial regulatory authority can serve as a coordinator
in controlling the strategic risk at a low cost. An analysis by Strahan and Tanyeri (2013) shows that money
market funds did not take much risk after the TGP was implemented, contrary to the moral hazard eﬀects.
Based on our results, one potential concern may be the possibility of a free-rider problem. When
there is a systemic risk and stability-building measures are established in some ﬁnancial institutions, other
38source: http://www.preservemoneymarketfunds.org
39SEC (http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4619-49.pdf)
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institutions may seek to underinvest in controlling risk (that is, purchasing insurance) since they can beneﬁt
from positive externalities from peer institutions. This free-rider problem is more pronounced when the
institutions are not mandated to enroll in the insurance and are charged a high premium. Therefore, if an
insurance scheme were introduced for money market funds, mandating enrollment would help mitigate the
free-rider problem.
8 Conclusions
This study shows that panic-driven runs were contagious in the U.S. money market fund industry in 2008.
Using a rich data set on money market funds daily ﬂows and the Temporary Guarantee Program by the
Treasury Department, we ﬁnd that investors generated self-fulﬁlling runs across funds. Our ﬁndings suggest
that panic among investors is not only an individual ﬁnancial institution's problem, but also a potentially
system-wide problem in a ﬁnancial market.
The way we identify the contagion risk across funds also illuminates an interesting aspect of the
government's conﬁdence-building measures such as deposit insurance in a ﬁnancial system. In our empirical
setting, funds' enrollment in the Treasury Department's guarantee program had a positive spillover eﬀect on
other funds. As the run risk was contagious, stability also spread across the funds when the government's
conﬁdence-building policy averted investors' panic. This suggests that a potential free-rider problem may
need to be addressed when implementing conﬁdence-building measures in the ﬁnancial market (e.g., deposit
insurance).
We also document that institutional and retail investors behaved diﬀerently after the introduction
of the government guarantee program. Retail investors did not return to money market funds investing in
non-government securities, even though the government provided an unprecedented guarantee program. By
contrast, institutional investors returned en masse to the money market funds. This behavior suggests that
more sophisticated institutional investors might have been the main beneﬁciaries of the policy, even though
the insurance premium structure did not diﬀer across investor types.
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Table 1: Variable deﬁnitions
Including only fund complexes with more than two money market funds, we have 43 fund complexes and 170 unique funds for
each daily observation. The sample period is the ﬁrst term of the Temporary Guarantee Program (TGP), September 19, 2008 
December 18, 2008. The total number of observations (fund × time) varies depending on the analysis period and can be found
at the end of each regression table.
Variable Unit Deﬁnition Mean SD Used for testing
ABCP* Percentage The percentage of asset-backed commercial
paper in the portfolio
8.47 11.57 -
AgencySecurity* Percentage The percentage of other U.S government is-
sued securities in the portfolio
10.96 18.32 -
AssetSizeComplex* Billion ($) Asset size at the complex level 24.82 45.78 -
BankSponsor* Dummy Dummy= 1 if a fund complex is a bank 0.40 0.49 -
CDS Percentage Credit default swap rate of fund complexes 3.00 3.94 Hypothesis 1
DaysAnnct* Days Number of business days taken for a fund com-
plex to announce its enrollment in the guar-
antee program
12.85 7.84 -
DomesticBank* Percentage The percentage of domestic bank obligations 7.96 10.02 -
DummyLehman* Dummy Dummy=1 if a fund had non-secured debt is-
sued by Lehman
0.21 0.36 -
DummyNonRepo* Dummy Dummy=1 if a fund had repo transactions
backed by non-Government securities.
0.11 0.28 -
Enroll Dummy Dummy=1 if a fund is enrolled in TGP as of
time t
0.82 0.38 Hypothesis 1
ExpenseRatio* Percentage Expense Ratio of a fund 0.60 0.25 -
FloatingRate* Percentage The percentage of adjustable or ﬂoating rate
notes that are issued with interest rates linked
to another market rate (LIBOR, 3-month T-
bill, etc).
18.67 17.14 -
Flow Percentage Fund daily net ﬂows as percentage of yester-
day's total net asset
0.04 8.34 Hypothesis 1/2
FlowSD* - Volatility of daily fund ﬂows over the last 6
months
1.92 3.08 -
ForeignBank* Percentage The percentage of foreign bank obligations 6.80 12.77 -
Lagged Flow Percentage One day lagged value of variable `Flow' 0.04 8.25 Hypothesis 1/2
MaturingIn7Days* Percentage Percentage of asset in a portfolio maturing in
7 days
0.28 0.14 -
Peer Fund Flow Percentage Peer funds' average daily net ﬂow as percent-
age of yesterday's total net asset within the
same fund complex
-1.80 4.21 Hypothesis 1
Peer Stability - Weighted number of peer funds enrolled in the
guarantee program as of time t with risk proxy
as weight
- - Hypothesis 1
Phase 1 Dummy Dummy=1 if time t belongs to September 15
- 19, 2008, when no government intervention
was introduced.
0.01 0.12 Hypothesis 2
Phase 2 Dummy Dummy=1 if time t belongs to September 20
- 29, 2008, when application window for the
guarantee program was not opened yet.
0.02 0.14 Hypothesis 2
Phase 3 Dummy Dummy=1 if time t belongs to September 30
- December 18, 2008 (i.e., the ﬁrst term of the
TGP)
0.19 0.39 Hypothesis 2
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Table 1 - continued
Variable Unit Deﬁnition Mean SD Used for testing
Phase 4 Dummy Dummy=1 if time t belongs to December 19,
2008 - April 30, 2009 (i.e., the second term of
the TGP)
0.29 0.45 Hypothesis 2
Phase 5 Dummy Dummy=1 if time t belongs to May 1 -
September 18, 2009 (i.e., the third term of the
TGP)
0.49 0.50 Hypothesis 2
Proxy 1 - unit measure 1 0 Hypothesis 1
Proxy 2 Percentage Fund ﬂow in a complex level right after
Lehman's bankrupcy (9/15-9/19/2008)
-8.31 12.66 Hypothesis 1
Proxy 3 - Number of portfolios in a fund complex with
non-secured debt issued by Lehman Brothers.
1.13 0.66 Hypothesis 1
Proxy 4 - Log of asset size of portfolios ($billion) in a
fund complex with non-secured debt issued by
Lehman Brothers.
1.05 0.84 Hypothesis 1
Proxy 5 - Number of portfolios in a fund complex
with repo transactions collateralized by non-
Government agency security
1.15 0.77 Hypothesis 1
Proxy 6 - Log of asset size of portfolios ($billion) in a
fund complex with repo transactions collater-
alized by non-Government agency security
1.23 0.84 Hypothesis 1
Proxy 7 - Correlation between funds' gross yield for the
past 12 months
0.98 0.11 Hypothesis 1
Repo* Percentage The percentage of assets invested in repur-
chase agreement transactions
10.68 12.61 -
Retail Dummy Dummy=1 if a shareclass is for retail investors 0.52 0.50 Hypothesis 2
RetailOriented* Dummy Dummy=1 if a fund complex had more than
50% assets from retail investors
0.49 0.50 -
TimeDeposit* Percentage Negotiable certiﬁcates of deposit (CDs) and
banker's acceptance (BAs) that are ﬁrst tier
or second tier securities, as deﬁned by the SEC
1.34 2.86 -
TripleA* Dummy Dummy=1 if a fund is rated as AAA by rating
agencies.
0.30 0.37 -
UsTreasury Percentage The percentage of assets invested in U.S. gov-
ernment securities
0.82 4.35 -
VIX - Measure of market volatility based on S & P
500
33.78 1.79 -
WeightedMaturity Days Weighted average maturity 43.78 10.50 -
Yield Percentage Annualized gross yield before expense 1.15 0.89 Hypothesis 2
Note: * indicates variables that are used to analyze enrollment status at a fund complex level. These variables were averaged
at a fund complex level over six months (March 15September 15, 2008). Some variable deﬁnitions are quoted directly from
the data provider's explanations.
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Table 2: Determinants of timing of fund complexes' announcement of enrollment in the TGP
This table presents the eﬀect of several variables on the timing of fund complexes' announcement of enrollment in the Temporary
Guarantee Program (TGP). The dependent variable is the number of business days taken for a fund complex to announce
its enrollment in the guarantee program. Independent variables include asset size, standard deviation of daily ﬂows at the
complex-level, credit ratings, gross return, expense ratio, the dummy variable for Lehman Brothers security, dummy variables
for non-agency repo, and portfolio allocations. All variables are averaged over six months (March 15September 15, 2008). To
provide a more complete analysis of enrollment timing of fund complexes, we include all fund complexes including those with
only one money market funds. This is why we have 75 fund complexes here unlike the hypotheses testings. The analysis results
show that retail-oriented fund complexes were more likely to announce their enrollment later than institutional-oriented fund
complexes. As the joint test result shows, other observable characteristics of fund complexes do not explain the announcement
timings.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FlowSD -0.129 -0.112 -0.103 -0.039
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
RetailOriented 4.418** 4.858** 4.435** 4.312*
(1.77) (2.00) (2.12) (2.35)
GrossReturn -0.373 0.158 -0.137
(5.44) (5.63) (5.68)
TripleA 3.158 3.104 4.442
(3.21) (3.15) (3.22)
BankSponsor 0.085 0.137 0.361
(2.45) (2.47) (2.47)
ExpenseRatio 0.237 0.545 1.642
(3.25) (3.36) (3.97)
AssetSizeComplex -0.013 -0.009 -0.003
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
DummyLehman 1.899 1.305
(2.60) (2.90)
DummyNonRepo -2.512 -1.631
(2.75) (2.76)
MaturingIn7Days -1.080
(10.98)
UsTreasury 0.009
(0.20)
AgencySecurity 0.118
(0.09)
Repo -0.037
(0.08)
TimeDeposit -0.165
(0.24)
DomesticBank -0.032
(0.08)
ForeignBank 0.045
(0.07)
FloatingRate 0.109
(0.07)
ABCP 0.008
(0.09)
Constant 11.934 9.414 9.988 5.738
(14.85) (14.67) (14.76) (5.82)
R-square 0.090 0.116 0.130 0.232
P 0.028 0.145 0.189 0.227
N 75 75 75 75
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Eﬀects of peer fund stability on own fund ﬂows
This table presents the eﬀect of peer funds' stability due to their enrollment in the Temporary Guarantee Program. We specify
the following regression equation:
Flowf,c,t+1 =α+ γ0t+
2∑
τ=0
γ1,τEnrollc,t × S(−c),t−τ + γ2Enrollc,t +
2∑
τ=0
γ3,τS(−c),t−τ
+ γ4Flowf,c,t + γ5Flowc(−f),t + γ6Yc + µc,t + ut + f,c,t+1, (6)
where f is fund, c is fund-complex, and t is time. The dependent variable is fund ﬂows of fund f in fund complex c in the next
period t+ 1.
Enrollc,t is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if a fund complex c was enrolled in the temporary guarantee as of t;
S(−c),t is an external stability measure from peer funds' enrollment in the Temporary Guarantee Program deﬁned as S(−c),t ≡∑
k 6=c 1
{
t = tk
} × Wk where Wk is the risk proxy of a fund complex k. S(−c),t−τ is lagged value of peer funds' stability
measures with time lag τ . The ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model is estimated with time ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobservable fund-level,
complex-level, and time-speciﬁc shocks. The time period covered is September 29December 19, 2008 which is the ﬁrst term
of the guarantee program. Generalized least squares (GLS) is used to estimate the model for eﬃciency gains in the face of a
time-varying variance of the error term f,c,t (Wooldridge (2002)).
Each column represents a diﬀerent proxy for risk (Wk) - (1): the equal weigting; (2): outﬂow right after Lehman's bankruptcy
(September 1519, 2008); (3): number of portfolios that had non-secured securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (4): log asset
size of portfolios that had non-secured securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (5): number of portfolios that had non-agency
repo transactions; (6): log asset size of portfolios that had non-agency repo transactions; (7): correlation between funds' gross
yields for the past 12 months.
The main coeﬃcients of interest are {γ1,τ}τ=2τ=0 which measure the asymmetric externality of peers' stability to already-enrolled
and non-enrolled funds. Negative γ1,τ implies that non-enrolled funds beneﬁted more from peers' stability thanks to their prior
enrollment in the Temporary Guarantee Program.
Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−2) -0.041** -0.005** -0.043*** -0.034** -0.045*** -0.036*** -0.036**
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−1) -0.012 -0.003** -0.009 -0.016 -0.004 -0.006 -0.015
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Enroll × Peer Stability(0) -0.015 -0.004** -0.019 -0.011 -0.025* -0.020 -0.010
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Enroll 0.568** 0.703*** 0.638*** 0.609*** 0.695*** 0.676*** 0.560***
(0.24) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18)
Lagged Flow -0.516*** -0.516*** -0.516*** -0.516*** -0.516*** -0.516*** -0.516***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lagged Peer Fund Flow 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint Test ({β1τ}τ=2τ=0) 0.061 0.040 0.035 0.053 0.019 0.039 0.075
N 9111 9111 9111 9111 9111 9111 9111
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
36
Table 4: Analysis of investor behavior before/after the guarantee program: Retail vs. institutional
This table shows that retail and institutional investors behaved diﬀerently before and after the introduction of the Temporary
Guarantee Program. The following model is estimated:
Flows,f,c,t =β0 +
5∑
τ=2
β1,τ
(
Is,f,c × Pt(τ)
)
+ β2Is,f,c +
5∑
τ=2
β3,τPt(τ) + β4Xf,c,t + β5Yc + us,f,c,t, (7)
where Flows,f,c,t is the daily ﬂows of share class s, fund f , fund complex c at time t ; Is,c,f is an indicator for an investor base
(0: institutional, 1: retail); Pt(τ) is an indicator for a phase which is 1 if t belongs to time frame τ and zero otherwise; phase
τ is deﬁned to be 1: September 1519, 2008; 2: September 2029, 2008; 3: September 30December 18, 2008; 4: December
19, 2008April 30, 2009; and 5: May 1December 18, 2009. In other words, time frame 1 represents the period of the Lehman
crisis, 2 represents the introduction period of the Temporary Guarantee Program, 3 represents the period of the ﬁrst term of
the Guarantee Program, 4 represents the second term, and 5 represents the the third term. Xf,c,t includes the fund portfolio
yield, νf is a fund level common shock, and µc is a fund complex level common shock.
The result shows that retail investors invested less in prime money market funds compared with institutional investors even after
the Temporary Guarantee Program became eﬀective. However, in government money market funds, retail investors behaved in
a similar way to institutional investors.
Prime Prime Prime Govt Govt Govt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Retail × Phase2 -0.138 -0.138 -0.138 -0.494 -0.496 -0.495
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.92) (0.92) (0.95)
Retail × Phase3 -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.949 -0.943 -0.950
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.71) (0.71) (0.78)
Retail × Phase4 -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -1.042 -1.030 -1.041
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.70) (0.70) (0.78)
Retail × Phase5 -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -1.028 -1.022 -1.029
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.71) (0.70) (0.78)
Phase2 0.135 0.135 0.135 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Phase3 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** -0.019*** -0.032 -0.029
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.07) (0.06)
Phase4 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.037*** -0.018*** -0.048 -0.039
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.12)
Phase5 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.038*** -0.013 -0.054 -0.041
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.14)
Retail 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 1.025 1.037 1.064
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.70) (0.70) (0.77)
Yield -0.001 0.001 -0.019 -0.013
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08)
Fund Complex FE No No Yes No No Yes
Portfolio FE Yes No No Yes No No
N 171680 171680 171680 166286 165167 165167
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Distribution of fund complexes' announcement timing of enrollment in the TGP
This graph plots the distribution of announcement dates of enrollment in the Temporary Guarantee Program by fund
complexes. The unit is the number of trading days from September 29, 2008 until the announcement date. Source: SEC
disclosure documents (Form 497) and author's calculation.
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Figure 2: Asymmetric spillover eﬀects of peer funds' TGP enrollment announcement
This graph shows the pattern of average fund ﬂow diﬀerences between already-enrolled and non-enrolled funds around peer
funds' enrollment announcements in the guarantee program. The ﬁrst vertical line indicates the date of peer funds'
announcement. The ﬂow pattern implies that the spillover eﬀect of peer funds' stability was greater for non-enrolled funds
than already-enrolled funds. If the spillover eﬀect of peer funds stability were greater for non-enrolled funds, then the ﬂow
diﬀerence between enrolled and non-enrolled funds would have to be narrowed after peer funds' enrollment announcement,
which is what this graph shows. A two-day lag of externality is consistent with the regression analysis result. For the
already-enrolled funds, ﬂow data since the two days after their own announcement was included to control for the impact of
their own announcement on the fund ﬂows. Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing was used to plot the ﬂow patterns.
Source: Author's calculation.
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Figure 3: Money market funds asset under management by investment and investor type
These graphs show the trend of assets under management of U.S. money market funds by categories of investment and
investors. The vertical line indicates the date of Lehman's collapse (September 15, 2008). The upper panel shows that there
was a ﬂight to quality episode: Investors withdrew from prime money market funds immediately following the Lehman shock
and invested in government money market funds. The lower left panel shows a stark diﬀerence between retail and institutional
investors in prime money market funds. Even after the Temporary Guarantee Program was eﬀective, retail investors did not
return and continue to withdraw their investments, while institutional investors returned to their funds. The lower right panel
shows that institutional and retail investors of government money market funds behaved in a similar way while the Temporary
Guarantee Program was eﬀective. Source: iMoneyNet and author's calculation.
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Figure 4: Amounts loaned under the AMLF program
This graph shows the pattern of amounts loaned under the the Federal Reserve Board's Asset-backed Commercial Paper
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), which was launched on the same day as the Treasury Department's
Temporary Guarantee Program. The vertical line indicates the date of the ﬁrst enrollment announcement in the guarantee
program. This graphs implies that the AMLF program was not used extensively after fund complexes began to announce
their enrollment in the Temporary Guarantee Program. Source: Federal Reserve Board and author's calculation.
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Figure 5: Fund ﬂow patterns in money market funds: Prime vs. Government funds
This graphs shows there were substantial diﬀerences between funds in terms of fund ﬂows after the Lehman shock. The left
panel shows the individual funds' daily ﬂows in prime money market funds, and the right shows the daily ﬂows in government
money market funds. The vertical line indicates the date of Lehman's collapse (September 15, 2008). Each fund's asset size
was normalized at one as of May 1, 2008. Source: iMoneyNet and author's calculation.
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Web Appendix
A Hypothesis development of contagious runs
This section provides models that apply the theoretical framework of Goldstein (2005) and Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005) to two money market fund settings. The goal of the ﬁrst model is to capture in the simplest
way the eﬀect of the Temporary Guarantee Program (TGP) on strategic complementarity between money
market funds. In particular, we make a simple assumption about the interlinkage of money market funds via
common collateral of repurchase agreement and focus on the predicted eﬀect of the Temporary Guarantee
Program in reducing the probability of a panic-driven run. The case of shared investment is omitted here
because it will be a trivial extension of the presented model.
A.1 Setting
There are two periods, t = 1, 2. Two groups of continuum investors I1 and I2 invest one unit of resource
in two funds, respectively. The funds allow investors to withdraw their investments early at t = 1, or hold
until t = 2. With resources received from investors, funds invest in long-term investments. These long-term
investments are assumed to be extremely illiquid, so the liquidation value at t = 1 is assumed to be 0.40
Thus, the investments should remain active (rolled over) until t = 2 to ﬁnance these projects eﬀectively.
To hedge against borrowers' default risk at t = 2 and honor possible redemption requests at t = 1,
funds request borrowers to pledge collateral. The function of money market funds can be considered as a
delegated agent of writing collateralized lending. Investment should be rolled over until t = 2 when it yields
Ri with probability 1 − θi or yields 0 with probability θi in which case the collateral should be sold at its
market price. To highlight our results, we assume the two projects have mutually independent default risk
{θ1, θ2}. Let r1 and r2 denote the short-term rate for each money market fund. Actually, this should be
equal to the risk-free rate since the posted collateral makes the investment risk-free. Note that we do not
consider any investors' learning mechanism here. Since the default risks are independent across funds, there
is nothing to learn from investors' behavior in other funds.
We assume borrowers and money market funds cannot raise additional capital. Thus, funds have to
sell collateral to honor early redemption requests by investors at t = 1 (Morris and Shin (2004)). We also
assume each fund receive the same asset class as collateral. If a certain asset class is considered to be liquid
and safe enough to serve as collateral, it will be widely used in secured lending contracts in the capital
40This assumption can be relaxed to have lower recovery rate than the promised payment in the short-term.
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market. Moreover, its liquidity characteristic will be preserved only because many lenders are willing to
receive this asset class as collateral. Thus the very purpose of collateral implies that the asset class serving
as collateral is widely held by many funds and its price can be aﬀected by selling/buying volume in the
market.41
The collateral's market price p1 at t = 1 is assumed to be inﬂuenced by selling volume of this asset
class. Another way to interpret this is that collateral price is sensitive to supply/demand because it is made
of tradable illiquid long-term assets (Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010)). More speciﬁcally, p1 (n1, n2) is a
decreasing function in the short-term withdrawal volume (n1 and n2 for each institution).
42 At t = 2, the
collateral price converges to f (µ) which is assumed to be increasing in its intrinsic value (µ).
At t = 1, investors receive a noisy signal about the default probability of the project in their funds.
An investor (labeled as j) at fund i receives a signal xji that is the sum of the true default risk θi and a noise
term ˜i:
xji =θi + ˜
j
i (8)
For simplicity, we assume {θ1, θ2} are independently drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, 1] and
{˜1, ˜2} are independently drawn from the uniform distribution on [−, ]. The signal can be interpreted
as each agent's private information about the quality of projects held by funds. Since agents delegate to
funds all investment decisions and the rights to sign contracts for collateralized lending, agents may have
only indirect channels or technology to collect information about the true quality of projects.
Fund i promises to pay ﬁxed return ri to investors when they seek to withdraw at t = 1. If an investor
chooses to wait, he will receive a return at t = 2 or the value of collateral in the case of the project's default.
If the collateral's market value is lower than the promised return (that is, p1 < ri), the fund must sell more
shares of collateral at the market price in order to honor the promised payment to investors. This is because
each investor will receive a promised payment ri, even though the market-base NAV (p1) is lower than ri.
If the fund has run short, any late withdrawal request will not be honored. The payoﬀ gain of running
41As noted by Gorton and Metrick (2012) and Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010), the real-world counterpart of this model
would be that MMFs buy asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) issued by special purpose vehicles (SPVs), which seek to use
the capital to ﬁnance their mortgage products or related businesses. MMFs receive AAA-tranches of mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) as collaterals.
42Compare Diamond and Rajan (2005), who indicated that the common pool of liquidity is abated by some bank failures,
which will aﬀect other banks' balance sheets. Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin (2005) presented that the sale of illiquid assets by
failed banks can generate a negative externality to other banks via a market-to-market scheme.
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compared to waiting at t = 1 is as follows:
vi (θi, ni (k, θi) ;n−i)
=u (ri)
−
θiu
(
min
{(
1− rip1(ni;n−i)ni
1− ni
)
f (µ) , Ri
})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
in case of default
+ (1− θi)u (Ri)︸ ︷︷ ︸
in case of success
 , (9)
where k is other investors' cutoﬀ point for the switching strategy. We are considering the non-recourse debt
contract, so the lender can collect repayment only up to the collateral value should in the borrower default.
If the collateral price p1 at t = 1 is suﬃciently higher than the promised payment ri (that is, p1 ≥ ri), the
fund does not have to sell more shares of collateral to meet redemption requests at t = 1. Therefore, the
sequential service constraint is not binding.43 Nevertheless, as the withdrawal request mounts (ni↑), there
will be more downward pressure on p1 and funds may need to sell the collateral at a distressed price.
44 This
makes sense especially when the AAA-rated collateral asset was believed to be very safe, but turned out to
be low quality, which occurred in the recent ﬁnancial crisis.45 Note that we only consider the case when fund
i is solvent (that is, p1 (ni;n−i) > rini). The insolvent case is omitted because it does not change our result.
A.2 Investors' optimal behaviors and the impact of the Temporary Guarantee
Program
We allow two possible extreme ranges for the project's default risk at t = 2. As assumed in many applications
of the theory of global games, we impose conditions on the range of default risk θi for each fund as follows:
Lower dominance region of the project's default: ∃θi such that ∀θi < θi, vi (θi, ni (k, θi) ;n−i) < 0
for all ni ∈ [0, 1] and n−i. In other words, as long as the project quality is very safe, the collateral value
or others' behavior does not matter. Waiting is a dominant strategy at t = 1 regardless of other investors'
choices at t = 1.
Upper dominance region of the project's default: ∃θi such that ∀θi > θi, vi (θi, ni (k, θi) ;n−i) > 0
for all ni ∈ [0, 1] and n−i. This condition indicates that if the default probability is too high, the collateral
43In other words, late comers can always redeem shares regardless of their peer investors because the fund does not have to
sell more shares than the withdrawal request.
44We assume p1 is depressed enough for large ni so that the single crossing condition of vi is satisﬁed (Morris and Shin
(2000)). ∂
(
1− ri
p1(ni;n−i)
ni
)
/∂ni =
[
p1 (ni;n−i)2 − p1 (ni;n−i) ri + rini (1− ni) p′1 (ni;n−i)
]
/ (1− ni)2 p1 (ni;ni)2. As
long as p1 is depressed enough with large ni, we can even show monotonicity condition, but the single crossing condition will
be enough for our purpose.
45Again, haircut was not enough to cover the loss.
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value will be too low to fully recover the promised payment should the borrower default at t = 2. Therefore,
running is a dominant strategy regardless of other investors' choices at t = 1.
As in the review article Morris and Shin (2000), we can show that, for all n−i, there exists a unique
threshold θ∗i (n−i) above which investors in fund i run on the fund.
46 This cutoﬀ point θ∗i (n−i) is the best
response function of fund i's investors in response to the fund −i 's withdrawal volume.
The direction of θ∗i (n−i) with respect to a change in n−i provides an important implication for the
contagious runs across money market funds. We deﬁne the expected payoﬀ gain of running in the following
way:
L (θi;n−i) ≡
ˆ 1
ni=0
vi (θi, ni;n−i) dni (10)
Because p1 (ni;n−i) is decreasing in n−i , vi (θi, ni;n−i) is increasing in n−i. Thus, L (θi;n−i) is increasing
in n−i for all θi. Since L (θi;n−i) is increasing in θi, the cutoﬀ signal θ∗i (n−i) that makes L (θi;n−i) = 0
should be decreasing in n−i. We highlight this result as in the following proposition:
Proposition. θ∗i (n−i) is decreasing in n−i.
This result implies that investors' decisions in fund i aﬀect investors' decisions in another fund even
though the projects' default risks {θ1, θ2} are independently distributed. When Fund 1's investors observe
that Fund 2 is run by its investors, they are more likely to run on Fund 1. The intuition behind this result
lies in the market value of collateral held by funds. When Fund 1 is facing a mass withdrawal request, it must
sell the collateral to honor those requests which, in turn, generates downward pressure on the market value
of the collateral asset. Investors' tolerance for bearing default risk decreases due to negative externality from
other funds via the collateral channel. Fund 2 faces a negative externality from Fund 1 investors' behavior,
in the sense that the collateral's market value held by Fund 2 is likely to decrease because their collaterals
were in the same asset class. Note that this contagion is not triggered by information updating about the
collateral values since we assume no uncertainty on the value of collateral (f (µ)) at this time. In this setting,
the two groups of investors in diﬀerent funds are exchanging externalities through the collateral channel.
Under the contagion eﬀect, the Treasury Department's Temporary Guarantee Program generates
positive externality across funds. Assume that Fund 1 announces its enrollment in the Temporary Guarantee
Program earlier than its peer Fund 2 for some reason. This eliminates the panic problem among investors in
Fund 1 because the strategic complementarity among investors is believed to be absorbed by the Treasury
Department. In the above model setting, the enrollment will make the cutoﬀ point θ∗1 (n2) equal to 1
46The proof is omitted here because of space limit, but the author will provide it upon request.
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regardless of n2, and there will not be a run on Fund 1. Interestingly, even though Fund 2 did not yet enroll
in the Temporary Guarantee Program, the likelihood of run on Fund 2 also decreases because the contagion
risk from Fund 1 is eliminated with the guarantee program and the threshold of run θ∗2 (n1 = 0) in Fund 2
increases towards 1 according to the above Proposition. In other words, the guarantee program can work as
a device to cut the chain of contagion.
An empirical test of the impact of the announcement of enrollment in the guarantee program enables
us to uncover the presence of the strategic complementarity across funds. Showing the positive externality
eﬀect of enrolled funds on other non-enrolled funds will provide evidence for contagion risk of runs. In other
words, we are looking for the ﬂipside of contagious runsthe spread of stabilityacross money market funds.
This is the rationale for Hypothesis 1. Because the announcement was usually made in a fund complex level,
testing this hypothesis will provide evidence for contagious runs across funds.
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B Data Sources
B.1 iMoneyNet
1. iMoneyNet reports information in share classes. We grouped several share classes into one portfolioID
based on their portfolio asset size. When several share classes had the same portfolio size at the same
date, we assigned the same portfolioID to them.
2. Each fund has a Ticker symbol that can be used to extract portfolio information from SEC disclosure
system (EDGAR).
B.2 SEC EDGAR system
1. We used a web-crawler to extract all relevant forms (Form 497, Form N-Q, Form N-CSR).
2. We manually extracted portfolio information (unsecured debt issued by Lehman, repo transactions
collateralized by U.S. government and non-governmental agency securities) from the schedule of in-
vestment section in the quarterly disclosure document as of the latest quarter from September 15,
2008.
3. We manually extracted enrollment date of funds in the Temporary Guarantee Program from the Form
497 (Deﬁnitive Materials).
48
C Robustness check and additional analyses
C.1 Robustness check
Table 5: Robustness Check 1: Eﬀect of peer fund stability across fund complexes excluding retail-oriented
fund complexes
This table presents the eﬀect of peer funds' stability thanks to enrollment in the Temporary Guarantee Program excluding
retail-oriented fund complexes. We conduct the analysis with only institutional-oriented fund complexes during September
28December 19, 2008. We deﬁne institutional-oriented fund complexes as those in which institutional-investors' asset size
exceeded more than 50% of the total assets on average over six months (March 15September 15, 2008).
Each column represents a diﬀerent proxy of risk (Wk) - (1): the equal weighting; (2): outﬂow right after Lehman's bankruptcy
(September 1519, 2008); (3): number of portfolios that had non-secured securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (4): log asset
size of portfolios that had non-secured securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (5): number of portfolios that had non-agency
repo transactions; (6): log asset size of portfolios that had non-agency repo transactions; (7): correlation between funds' gross
yield for the past 12 months.
Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−2) -0.067** -0.007** -0.068** -0.054** -0.074*** -0.054** -0.067**
(0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−1) -0.039 -0.007*** -0.042* -0.047** -0.027 -0.033 -0.041*
(0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Enroll × Peer Stability(0) -0.038 -0.008*** -0.045* -0.028 -0.060** -0.048** -0.027
(0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Enroll 1.063** 1.361*** 1.284*** 1.327*** 1.218*** 1.173*** 1.139***
(0.44) (0.36) (0.44) (0.36) (0.40) (0.38) (0.31)
Lagged Flow -0.510*** -0.511*** -0.510*** -0.510*** -0.510*** -0.509*** -0.510***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lagged Peer Fund Flow 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.010** 0.011** 0.011**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint Test ({β1τ}τ=2τ=0) 0.031 0.006 0.014 0.015 0.007 0.016 0.030
N 6185 6185 6185 6185 6185 6185 6185
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 6: Robustness Check 2: Eﬀect of peer fund stability across fund complexes over a shorter time
This table presents the eﬀect of peer funds' stability due to their enrollment in the Temporary Guarantee Program over a
shorter period. The new analysis period is September 28November 7, 2008, when the last fund announced its enrollment in
the guarantee program.
Each column represents a diﬀerent proxy of risk (Wk) - (1): the equal weighting; (2): outﬂow right after Lehman's bankruptcy
(September 1519, 2008); (3): number of portfolios that had non-secured securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (4): log asset
size of portfolios that had non-secured securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (5): number of portfolios that had non-agency
repo transactions; (6): log asset size of portfolios that had non-agency repo transactions; (7): correlation between funds' gross
yield for the past 12 months.
Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−2) -0.038** -0.004** -0.036** -0.029** -0.040*** -0.030** -0.033**
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−1) -0.010 -0.003** -0.010 -0.014 -0.006 -0.008 -0.013
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Enroll × Peer Stability(0) -0.015 -0.003** -0.020 -0.010 -0.022 -0.018 -0.010
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Enroll 0.661*** 0.704*** 0.620*** 0.583*** 0.669*** 0.639*** 0.554***
(0.23) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
Lagged Flow -0.511*** -0.510*** -0.511*** -0.511*** -0.511*** -0.511*** -0.511***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lagged Peer Fund Flow -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint Test ({β1τ}τ=2τ=0) 0.050 0.036 0.044 0.062 0.022 0.057 0.065
N 4387 4387 4387 4387 4387 4387 4387
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 7: Robustness Check 3: Eﬀect of peer fund stability across fund complexes over a shorter time
This table presents the eﬀect of peer funds' stability due to their enrollment in the Temporary Guarantee Program over a shorter
period. The new analysis period is September 28October 8, 2008, during which funds had to actually ﬁle their application for
the guarantee program.
Each column represents a diﬀerent proxy of risk (Wk) - (1): the equal weighting; (2): outﬂow right after Lehman's bankruptcy
(September 1519, 2008); (3): number of portfolios that had non-secured securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (4): log asset
size of portfolios that had non-secured securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (5): number of portfolios that had non-agency
repo transactions; (6): log asset size of portfolios that had non-agency repo transactions; (7): correlation between funds' gross
yield for the past 12 months.
Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−2) -0.021 -0.016 -0.001 -0.021 -0.115 -0.028 -0.091
(0.13) (0.02) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−1) 0.045 0.008 -0.005 -0.016 -0.068 -0.050 -0.002
(0.15) (0.02) (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (0.08) (0.15)
Enroll × Peer Stability(0) -0.178** -0.017** -0.162** -0.133** -0.065** -0.114*** -0.108
(0.09) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07)
Enroll 2.171** 1.888* 2.180** 2.063** 2.019** 2.409*** 1.726**
(0.93) (1.03) (0.92) (0.86) (0.86) (0.86) (0.73)
Lagged Flow -0.475*** -0.472*** -0.476*** -0.476*** -0.471*** -0.476*** -0.483***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Lagged Peer Fund Flow 0.009 -0.002 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.002 0.014
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint Test ({β1τ}τ=2τ=0) 0.006 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.003
N 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 8: Robustness Check 4: Eﬀect of peer fund stability across fund complexes without time ﬁxed eﬀects
This table presents the eﬀect of peer funds' stability due to their enrollment in the Temporary Guarantee Program. We conduct
the analysis without time ﬁxed eﬀects during September 28December 19, 2008.
Each column represents a diﬀerent proxy of risk (Wk) - (1): the equal weighting; (2): outﬂow right after Lehman's bankruptcy
(September 1519, 2008); (3): number of portfolios that had non-secured securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (4): log asset
size of portfolios that had non-secured securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (5): number of portfolios that had non-agency
repo transactions; (6): log asset size of portfolios that had non-agency repo transactions; (7): correlation between funds' gross
yield for the past 12 months.
Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−2) -0.045*** -0.007*** -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.039*** -0.027*** -0.042***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−1) -0.049*** -0.005*** -0.041*** -0.035*** -0.044*** -0.036*** -0.046***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Enroll × Peer Stability(0) -0.005 -0.002*** -0.017** -0.011* -0.014* -0.017** -0.009
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Enroll 0.654*** 0.653*** 0.669*** 0.567*** 0.717*** 0.681*** 0.665***
(0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Lagged Flow -0.508*** -0.509*** -0.507*** -0.508*** -0.508*** -0.508*** -0.508***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lagged Peer Fund Flow 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time FE No No No No No No No
Joint Test ({β1τ}τ=2τ=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 9111 9111 9111 9111 9111 9111 9111
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 9: Robustness Check 5: Eﬀect of peer fund stability across fund complexes with 3 days lag
This table presents the eﬀect of peer funds' stability due to their enrollment in the Temporary Guarantee Program. We conduct
the analysis again with a three-day lag of peer stability during September 28December 19, 2008.
Each column represents a diﬀerent proxy of risk (Wk) - (1): the equal weighting; (2): outﬂow right after Lehman's bankruptcy
(September 1519, 2008); (3): number of portfolios that had non-secured securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (4): log asset
size of portfolios that had non-secured securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (5): number of portfolios that had non-agency
repo transactions; (6): log asset size of portfolios that had non-agency repo transactions; (7): correlation between funds' gross
yield for the past 12 months.
Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−3) 0.008 -0.001 0.028* 0.019 0.021 0.011 0.002
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−2) -0.041** -0.005** -0.042** -0.031** -0.045*** -0.034** -0.036**
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−1) -0.012 -0.003* -0.006 -0.013 0.000 -0.005 -0.015
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Enroll × Peer Stability(0) -0.015 -0.004** -0.027 -0.013 -0.033* -0.021 -0.009
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Enroll 0.717** 0.777*** 0.636*** 0.620*** 0.667*** 0.624*** 0.546***
(0.28) (0.25) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19)
Lagged Flow -0.512*** -0.512*** -0.512*** -0.512*** -0.512*** -0.512*** -0.512***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lagged Peer Fund Flow 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint Test ({β1τ}τ=2τ=0) 0.138 0.106 0.044 0.083 0.034 0.086 0.152
N 8941 8941 8941 8941 8941 8941 8941
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 10: Robustness Check 6: Eﬀect of peer fund stability across fund complexes with credit default swap
data
This table presents the eﬀect of peer funds' stability due to their enrollment in the Temporary Guarantee Program. We conduct
the analysis again with the credit default swap (CDS) rate of fund complexes during September 28December 19, 2008. CDS
rate data was available for 17 fund complexes from Thomson-Reuters (2012).
Each column represents a diﬀerent proxy of risk (Wk) - (1): the equal weighting; (2): outﬂow right after Lehman's bankruptcy
(September 1519, 2008); (3): number of portfolios that had non-secured securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (4): log asset
size of portfolios that had non-secured securities issued by Lehman Brothers; (5): number of portfolios that had non-agency
repo transactions; (6): log asset size of portfolios that had non-agency repo transactions; (7): correlation between funds' gross
yield for the past 12 months.
Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy Proxy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−2) -0.097** -0.013 -0.106** -0.069** -0.092** -0.080** -0.097**
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Enroll × Peer Stability(−1) -0.056 -0.007 -0.047 -0.059* -0.038 -0.052 -0.069
(0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Enroll × Peer Stability(0) -0.005 -0.008 -0.031 -0.003 -0.043 -0.024 -0.009
(0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Enroll 1.722** 1.527** 1.499** 1.983*** 1.593** 1.652** 1.406**
(0.80) (0.66) (0.72) (0.62) (0.80) (0.78) (0.58)
Lagged Flow -0.505*** -0.506*** -0.505*** -0.506*** -0.506*** -0.506*** -0.506***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lagged Peer Fund Flow 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CDS -0.007 -0.006 -0.015 -0.008 -0.010 -0.012 -0.005
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint Test ({β1τ}τ=2τ=0) 0.172 0.209 0.113 0.114 0.180 0.181 0.077
N 3127 3127 3127 3127 3127 3127 3127
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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C.2 Additional analysis: contagious runs within a fund complex
C.2.1 Hypothesis development: contagious runs within a fund complex
An additional hypothesis we test is whether investors in money market funds withdrew their investments
because they were concerned about their arms-length peer funds' withdrawals in the same fund complex.
This hypothesis is related to the relationship between money market funds and the sponsoring company. If
one fund in a fund complex experiences a run by investors and must sell its assets at a distressed price, the
fund's NAV might fall below $0.995. To prevent this incidence, the fund-sponsoring company might provide
additional liquidity to support the $1 NAV. Other funds within the same sponsoring company are sharing a
common liquidity pool that can be used to support each fund. If an investor believes peer funds in the same
fund complex will be run by their investors, potentially depleting the sponsoring company's liquidity pool,
the investor is more likely to withdraw from the fund. This mechanism generates a self-fulﬁlling crisis within
the fund complex, even though investment fundamentals in each fund may be sound enough to produce
higher yields in the long run. This mechanism is developed more formally in Section A, using a global game
framework. Therefore, our another goal is to test for the existence of a panic-driven contagious run within
a fund complex.
Hypothesis: Investors' redemption requests were positively inﬂuenced by peers' redemption requests in
the same fund complex.
Identifying this peer eﬀect can be challenging, because abrupt redemption requests may be due to
unobserved common shocks (for example, sponsor risk). For this reason, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
estimates may embed a spurious correlation even though there may be no causal link among peers' redemption
requests (Manski (1993)). In our study, we use panel data structure to control for unobserved common shocks
and to test for the impact of such peer or strategic complementarity eﬀects immediately following the Lehman
Brothers' collapse.
C.2.2 Empirical analysis
We also investigate whether there was a contagion risk of runs within fund complexes, immediately following
the Lehman Brothers' collapse. In pursuit of our empirical goal, we estimate the following model:
Flowf,c,t = α+ β0t+ β1Flowc(−f),t−1 + β2Flowf,c,t−1 + β3Xt + β4Flow(−c),t−1 + τc,t + uf,c,t (11)
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The dependent variable Flowf,c,t is the fund ﬂow for fund f in fund complex c between time t − 1
and t. Following the standard practice in mutual fund literature, we measure fund ﬂow by Flowf,c,t ≡
TNAt−TNAt−1×(1+Y ieldt)
TNAt−1
× 100 where TNAt is the total net assets managed by the fund and Y ieldt is its
(daily) return. Covariates include the following:
• Flowc(−f),t−1 is average lagged ﬂows of peer funds deﬁned as
∑
k 6=f TNAk,c,t−1−
∑
k 6=f TNAk,c,t−2×(1+Y ieldk,c,t−1)∑
k 6=f TNAk,c,t−2
×
100 where TNAk,c,t is the total net asset of fund k in fund complex c at time t;
• Flowf,c,t−1 is lagged ﬂow for the own fund f ;
• Flow(−c),t−1 is average lagged ﬂows of peer fund complexes deﬁned as
∑
k 6=c TNAk,t−1−
∑
k 6=c TNAk,t−2×(1+Y ieldk,t−1)∑
k 6=c TNAk,t−2
×
100 where TNAk,t is the total asset size of fund complex k at time t;
• Xt is a marketwide variable at time t (for example, VIX index);
• τc,t: unobservable fund complex-level shock; and
• f,c,t: idiosyncratic shock.
Our assumption is that peer funds' ﬂows are observed with a lag. This assumption is realistic, because the
shortest data frequency is daily: Investors could not contemporaneously observe their peer investors action
but they could observe daily fund ﬂows with lags. Another advantage of assuming a delayed impact of peer
funds' ﬂows is that a simultaneity problem between one's own and peer funds ﬂows does not arise in this
case (Manski (1993)).
The coeﬃcient of interest is β1, which reﬂects the sensitivity of a fund f 's ﬂow to peer funds' ﬂows
with a one-day lag. With a causal interpretation, positive β1 implies that investors in fund f were more
likely to withdraw in response to their peer investors' withdrawals from the same fund complex. That is,
because of their peers' actions, investors were herding in the same direction.
In a cross-sectional setting, it is challenging to identify the peer eﬀect because a common shock to all
investors in the same fund complex (τc,t) can generate a spurious correlation in investor behaviors (Manski
(1993)). For example, investors could withdraw from a fund when they perceived that the fund's sponsoring
company was unable to support the fund (fund complex level common shock τc,t). In such cases, all investors
might withdraw due to a common shock rather than the fear of peer withdrawals, so the OLS estimate of the
coeﬃcient would reﬂect a spuriously positive correlation even if investors did not react to other investors'
behaviors. Thus, this correlation cannot be interpreted as a causal peer eﬀect.
To overcome these diﬃculties, we use a panel data structure with daily fund ﬂows. Assuming that
fund complex shocks (τc,t) are additively decomposable into time-invariant and time-speciﬁc parts, we can
56
identify separately the peer eﬀect from the correlation eﬀect by introducing fund complex ﬁxed eﬀects and
time ﬁxed eﬀects. Allowing for potentially strong serial correlation in f,c,t which is commonly observable
in high frequency data during ﬁnancial market turmoil,47 we ﬁrst-diﬀerence the empirical model to have the
following:
∆Flowf,c,t = β0 + β1∆Flowc(−f),t−1 + β2∆Flowf,c,t−1 + β3∆Xt + β4∆Flow(−c),t−1 + ∆uf,c,t (12)
We run this regression for the analysis period of September 15, 2008 (when Lehman collapsed) through
September 28, 2008 (when the TGP application window opened).
Estimation results are presented in Table 11, where the peer eﬀect (β1) in the ﬁrst row is the coeﬃcient
of interest. Columns 1  3 present results of OLS regression with one's own fund's one-day lagged ﬂows and
columns 4  6 present results of OLS regression with two-day lagged ﬂows. In columns (3) and (6), we control
time ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁnd a stong positive eﬀect of peer funds' lagged ﬂow on the own fund's ﬂow. The
positive coeﬃcient estimate of the variable peer funds' ﬂow indicates that investors were herding in the
same direction (either withdrawing or investing) along with their peers. These results support Hypothesis
2 concerning contagious runs within fund complexes. Moreover, the coeﬃcient's economic signiﬁcance is
substantial. With a one-day lag, the peer eﬀect (β1) is 6.5 percentage points. Considering the median
asset size of a fund ($5 billion) on September 15, 2008 and the average magnitude of the peer funds' daily
withdrawal (0.9% a day), a fund experienced, on a conservative measure, $2.9 million in outﬂows per day,
when a peer fund within the same complex was withdrawn by investors.
47More speciﬁcally, we assume uf,c,t = uf,c,t−1 + f,c,t where
{
f,c,t
}
t
are serially uncorrelated and independent with
uf,c,t−1. This assumption implies that yesterday's idiosyncratic shock to investors is not attenuated much and aﬀects today's
investors behavior with similar magnitude combined with a white noise. The `non-attenuatedness' assumption is realistic in our
setting because we are considering investors' behavior with a very short frequency (i.e., daily).
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Table 11: Eﬀects of peer fund stability on one's own fund ﬂows: Within fund complexes
This table presents the evidence of the strategic complementarity of investors within a fund complex. We specify a regression
model:
Flowf,c,t = α+ β0t+ β1Flowc(−f),t−1 + β2Flowf,c,t−1 + β3Xt + β4Flow(−c),t−1 + τc,t + uf,c,t (13)
where c is fund complex, f is fund, and t is time. The dependent variable is the ﬂows of fund f in a fund complex c at period
t. Flowc(−f),t−1 is peer funds' ﬂows in the same fund complex except the fund f . Xt is a marketwide variable at time t such
as the VIX index, Flow(−c),t−1 is average ﬂows of peer fund complex, τc,t is an unobservable fund complex level shock, and
f,c,t is an idiosyncratic shock to fund f in complex c at time t. The analysis period is September 1528, 2008. To control for
unobservable shocks at a fund complex levels, a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model is estimated. Additionally, to control for unobservable
time-speciﬁc shock, the model is estimated with time ﬁxed eﬀects in some speciﬁcations. Columns 1  3 present the results of
OLS regression with own fund's one-day lagged ﬂows and columns 4  6 present the results of OLS regression with own funds'
two-day lagged ﬂows.
The coeﬃcient of interest is the impact of peer funds' ﬂows on own fund ﬂows (β1). The positive coeﬃcient estimate of the
variable peer funds ﬂows implies that investors were herding in the same direction (either withdrawing or investing) because
of their peers' similar actions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peer Funds' Flowt−1 0.047** 0.045* 0.065** 0.066** 0.064** 0.089***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Own Fund's Flowt−1 -0.476*** -0.477*** -0.472*** -0.621*** -0.620*** -0.617***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Own Fund's Flowt−2 -0.349*** -0.345*** -0.351***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Peer Complexes' Flowt−1 0.140** 0.215*** 5.514* 0.192*** 0.256*** 6.703
(0.06) (0.07) (3.01) (0.06) (0.06) (4.20)
VIX Indext -0.190*** -0.163***
(0.06) (0.05)
Constant -0.016 0.061 9.286* -0.018 0.048 11.237
(0.04) (0.05) (5.23) (0.05) (0.05) (7.30)
Time FE No No Yes No No Yes
N 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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